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DECISION MODELS IN SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT: A SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY PERSPECTIVE
SWATHI REDDY BADDAM
ABSTRACT
Recent events in emerging countries concerning supplier unethical practices and the
resulting fatalities have stressed the need for social responsibility in supply chains. Rising
consumer awareness regarding such events and their negative impact pose a challenge in
supply management decisions for firms. This research integrates the risk of supplier
irresponsibility and the impact of such events from the consumer perspective in developing
supply management decision models for maximizing economic performance of firms. Two
important issues in supply management: supplier selection and supplier development are
addressed through stylized modeling approach.
First, a supplier selection decision model is analyzed that will aid a firm to select
between an ethical and unethical (risky) supplier considering the supplier learning for
long-term contracts. Next, the decision model is modified to study supplier development
decision considering penalty costs to select between three development decisions:
direct/binding, non-binding, and third-party/intermediaries.
v
Our results suggest that firms prefer long-term type of strategies in both supplier
selection and development under high risk or impact or both. Contingent policies are only
optimal for supplier selection decisions, while firms may use intermediate
sourcing/development when the penalty costs are high and the cost of sourcing is low.
However, it is also economically optimal for firms to choose unethical supplier or to not
invest in supplier development when the risk and the impact are extremely low. This
research contributes to the literature in operations and supply chain management by
addressing social responsibility including the consumer perspective addressing the research
gap in the field of operations and supply chain management.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Supply chain management and sustainability management are progressively
becoming more synonymous among various firms, even more with the recent wake of
expanding supply chains.
The United Nations recognizes supply chain sustainability as a critical issue, since it
is closely connected to global areas such as human rights, labor force, environment and
anti-corruption. In fact, organizations that primarily operate to maximize profits for their
stakeholders are seeing the value of this issue and are beginning to implement these more
recent supply management decisions.
In addition to cost and quality, supplier ethics is becoming another key factor to
consider after a series of unethical practices in supply chains became publicized. For
instance, in the garment industry, unsafe working conditions have resulted in two recent
incidents in the capital of Bangladesh last year, killing at least 1130 people in the last year
in the capital of Bangladesh (McLain, 2013). In another incident, a factory in Cambodia
that produces sneakers for ASICS collapsed and three people were killed (McDowell et al.,
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2013). Even after a spate of suicides and accidents in factories located in China over the
past five years, Foxconn, the world’s biggest contract manufacturer for consumer
electronics, again reported incidents resulting in deaths of two workers in late April 2013
(Luk, 2013). In Indonesia, tin, an essential material for producing tablets and smartphones,
has led to 44 deaths in 2011 because of unsafe working conditions (Simpson, 2012). These
tragedies have drawn great deal of attention from both consumers and government officials,
forcing them to examine all unethical issues in the low labor cost regions which serve the
world’s product demands. Growing concerns of losing reputation, in addition to compliance
pressure from government agencies has led firms to start scrutinizing their supplier
production practices and using ethical production as qualification for sourcing decisions.
However, many companies focus more on the short-run tradeoff between cost and
ethics at the expense of long run performance, when making sourcing decisions. For
instance, shortly after the deadly fire and collapse incidents, Disney completely cut
Bangladesh out of its supply chain while Wal-Mart, Gap and J.C. Penney contracted with
other Bangladeshi factories, but refused to sign a legally binding accord to improve fire and
building safety there. Alternatively, some European companies, like H&M, Inditex, and
PVH, agreed to sign the accord and form a more effective coalition to improve the safety
and working conditions (Berfield, 2013).
In January 2012, under social pressure from the suicides and an explosion at
Foxconn facilities, Apple Inc., for the first time, disclosed in the new “Supplier
Responsibility” report, a supplier list with detailed auditing and training programs to
better monitor and improve conditions at factories (Vascellaro, 2012). The report found
that 62% of its suppliers were not compliant with working-hours limits, 32% violated
hazardous-substance management practices, and 35% failed to meet Apple Inc.’s standards
to prevent worker injuries.
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Firms may adopt supplier development strategies in response to violations by
supplier either to preserve their brand reputation or to improve cost efficiency. For
instance, after a series of incidents in China and Bangladesh, there was sudden rise in
wages at Foxconn that are shared by Apple (Ruwitch, 2012). Walmart, GE, Nike, and
Adidas are few of the many companies that are also working to improve their sustainability
performance (Plambeck, 2012). After the fatal incident in Bangladesh, numerous firms
agreed to sign safety pacts that require them to invest in additional supplier development
activities for ensuring safe working practices in factories (Butler, 2013). Although, a few
firms opted out of entering into safety agreements and instead chose to retain their existing
operations, several companies such as American Eagle Outfitters, H&M, and Benetton did
join long-term safety programs that require them to commit to provide financial support to
supplier safety programs in Bangladesh for a period of atleast five years.
Moreover, the Automotive Industry Action Group has also succumbed to these
growing concerns and issued guiding principles to improve sustainability performance in
supply chains focusing on working conditions, human rights, and business ethics (AIAG,
2014).
Another alternative that is gaining popularity enables firms to address compliance of
social and environmental regulations in supply chains by sourcing through intermediaries
such as Li & Fung Ltd. In January 2010, Wal-Mart decided to enter into an open-ended
sourcing arrangement with Li & Fung Ltd. (Belavina, 2012). Sourcing through
third-parties is quickly rising because firms expect the intermediary to take full
responsibility for safe working conditions along with maintaining protection against any
violation of human rights.
Undeniably, ethical production or supplier development investments often involve
high costs but unethical sourcing may also increase long-run costs significantly. It is overtly
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apparent that, additional measures such as supplier development investments which ensure
ethical production often involve higher initial costs but conversely, longstanding unethical
sourcing also significantly increases costs in the long-run. If consumer’s willingness-to-pay
is influenced by socially responsible behavior, it would ultimately influence the profitability
of the firm (Banjo, 2013). As reflected in a statement from the President of Disney’s
consumer products division, Bob Chapek, firms must balance profit and reputation against
the backdrop of a disastrous social irresponsible incident.
“These are complicated global issues and there is no one size fits all solution..”.
“Disney is a publicly held company accountable to its shareholders and after
much thought and discussion we felt this was the most responsible way to
manage the challenges associated with our supply chain” (Palmeri and Rupp,
2013).
Given the increased utilization of contract manufacturing, these recent
developments, along with increasing consumer awareness, makes ethical supply
management an increasingly integral part of corporate social responsibility. However, many
companies focus more on the short-run tradeoff between cost and ethics, but at the
expense of longer-run performance, when selecting a supplier or making a decision to invest
in supplier development.
The purpose of our study regarding supply management is two-fold. First, we are
motivated to study the supplier selection problem and provide optimal strategies for firms
who face the risk of supplier violations. Second, we extend to offer solutions for supplier
development problem for firms who face the risk of supplier violations. Overall, our aim is
to present optimal strategies in supply management from a social responsibility perspective.
4
CHAPTER II
Literature Review
2.1 Sustainability
The Brundtland Report on sustainable development for the United Nations
(Brundtland, 1987; Elkington, 1997) proposes three types of capital defining the triple
bottom line for corporate sustainability: (1) economic (profit); (2) environmental (planet);
and (3) social (people) capital. Sustainability is being strongly recognized as a critical
element in supply chain management (Linton, Klassen, and Jayaraman, 2007; Kleindorfer,
et al. 2005, & Van Wassenhove, 2005). Pagell (2009) integrate three pillars of
sustainability to describe a “sustainable supply chain” as the one that performs well both
on traditional measures of profit and on expanded conceptualization of performance that
includes social and environmental dimensions.
A number of papers have been published addressing sustainability in the field of
operations and supply chain management. Providing a comprehensive review, Seuring and
Muller (2008) surveyed 191 papers published between 1994 and 2007 addressing
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sustainability issues in supply chain management. They found that while 74% of literature
focused on the environmental dimension of sustainability, only 11% address social
dimension, and the remaining 15% included both dimensions in the research. Regarding
the research methodology used, they found that only about 10% of the papers use
mathematical models, while more than 60% of the papers utilize case study or empirical
analysis. Tang and Zhou (2012) and Seuring (2013) provide comprehensive reviews on
research applying modeling techniques in sustainable supply chain management. However,
both reviews observe that the social aspect is widely ignored as the extant quantitative
research is mainly focused on the environmental measure. Clearly, there is a lack of
literature addressing social aspect of sustainability that utilize quantitative models.
2.2 Supply Risk Management
Sourcing decisions are vital for effective supply management; integrating a number
of papers published concerning supplier sourcing, Talluri and Narasimhan (2004) develop a
strategic sourcing framework that deals with the effective management of the supply base
through sourcing strategies such as strategic partnerships, supplier development activities.
For supplier evaluation and selection problems, Ho, Xu, and Dey (2010) present a
comprehensive review of popular multi-criteria decision making approaches. They found
that the top three popular criteria (>80%) used for evaluating the supplier performance
are quality, followed by delivery, and cost. In contrast, the long-run social attributes
(relationship, risk, and safety & environment) are the least used criteria (<4%) among the
78 papers reviewed from 2000 to 2008 (Sarkis and Talluri, 2002; Kull and Talluri, 2008;
Huang and Keskar, 2007).
Talluri, Narsimhan and Chung (2010) present an analytical model to address the
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risk for optimal allocation decisions in supplier development program. However, their
model does not specifically address the sustainability related risk. Because of the
significance of supply risk management for a successful sustainable supply chain, Butner
(2010)suggests that sustainability-related risk should be factored into sourcing decisions.
From interviews of top executives, Manuj and Mentzer (2008) propose two components of
risk: (1) impact (potential losses if the risk is realized); and (2) likelihood of the impact
(the probability of the occurrence of an event that leads to realization of the risk). By
synthesizing risk management literature, Foerstl et al., (2010) develop an extended
conceptual framework for sustainable risk management identifying: risk identification,
assessment, consequences, response and outcomes as stages of the risk management
process. The framework asserts that supplier selection plays a proactive role in the risk
mitigation process in foreseeing the consequences and associated outcomes that would
benefit firms in decision making under uncertainty.
In terms of the social aspect, supplier ethics has emerged as an important part of
corporate social responsibility in safeguarding organizations from being accused of
unethical behavior and subsequent reputation damage (Carter and Easton, 2011). Carter
and Jennings (2004) empirically examine the drivers of purchasing social responsibility
with results indicating that consumer pressure is a critical and significant factor along with
organizational culture and top management support, but governmental regulations are not
significant. Klassen and Vereecke (2012) find that irresponsible events leave the firm with
social risk leading to uncertain negative outcomes on performance. The consumer
perspective is reiterated in a study by Melnyk et al., (2010), who state that modern supply
chains should be designed with sustainability being one of the outcomes based on
consumer’s needs. Moreover, experimental studies by Creyer and Ross (1997) indicate that,
although consumers buy from unethical firms, they punish them by demanding lower
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prices. On the other hand, De Pelsmacker, Driesen, and Rayp (2005) find from their survey
that consumers pay premium prices for ethical products. In a more recent experimental
work, Trudel and Cotte (2009) investigate the impact of ethical production with results
suggesting that the punishment exacted is far greater than the premium consumers are
willing to pay.
To date, much of the academic literature in the operations management field fails to
consider the consumer perspective in assessing social responsibility risk (Tang and Zhou
2012), despite the evidence that the consumer will pay less for unethical products (Trudel
and Cotte, 2009). For instance, commenting on Zaras business model, the company’s senior
executive said, “At Zara, the supply chain is the business model”. The operations
management field has moved from a narrow focus on costs to an appreciation of the
customer (i.e. service, willingness to pay) to a closer scrutiny of assets (Kleindorfer, 2005).
2.3 Supplier Sourcing and Development
Within supply management modeling literature, we focused our review within the
literature the addresses social responsibility risks in supplier sourcing and (or) development
problems. Xu et al., (2013) present a AHP (Analytical Heirarchy Process) model for
supplier selection including criteria such as, human rights issues, underage labor, and long
working hours. Chen and Lee (2014) also present a model that examine the supplier
responsibility risk mitigation focused on emerging economies, since sourcing from these
economies often involves greater risk. Though these researchers do not explicitly study the
relationship between inspection or monitoring and the risks involved, the study does
disclose that higher inspection efforts lead to lower likelihood of supplier irresponsibility.
Guo, Lee,and Swinney (2014) study the impact of supply chain structure on a firm’s
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decision in choosing a socially responsible supplier to find that the structure plays an
important role in determining the optimal decision.
While supplier selection is very crucial for risk mitigation, supplier development also
plays an important role in supply risk management. Locke and Brause (2007) find from the
case study of Nike that their supplier compliance has improved over time after
implementing various supplier development initiatives. This is after Nike has been held
responsible for sweatshop conditions in many of its supplier factories. Nonetheless, the
literature addressing supplier development in the context of “sustainability risk
management” is steadily growing. Chan and Kumar (2007) examine the supplier
development problem by integrating it into the selection decision-making process by
considering risk factors such as political turmoil, terrorism, and economy, and supplier
profile.
Chiou, Tzeng, and Cheng (2005) further examine supplier development strategies in
the aquatic industry with multiple dependent criteria including, business aspects,
regulations, and socio-economic effects. Plambeck and Taylor (2014) examine the supplier
motivation problem, for instance, ensuring the compliance of labor and environmental
standards, with the results of the study indicating that increasing inspection effort is not
adequate. Their research goes on to suggest that firms may motivate suppliers by reducing
their profit margin in the supplier contract or through raising worker wages. In an
alternative approach, Kim (2013) find that the increase in penalties for violation does not
reduce the need for inspection, while random inspections are not always preferred.
Belavina and Girotra (2012) find that sourcing through intermediaries which is
gaining popularity, can improve supply chain performance regarding sustainability even in
unfavorable situations such as, absence of accurate information and even may outperform
the direct sourcing. More specifically, their model follows three steps: (1) information
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gathering; (2) supplier selection; and (3) the actual transaction (selling) of the product in a
multiple buyers and sellers in the setting. Similarly, Mendoza and Clemen (2013) study a
model in which a firm outsources its supplier improvement programs to a seller by
investing in the effort. They find that a firm’s sustainability efforts increase with both their
stakeholders’ interest in sustainability performance and, when the firm’s support to the
supplier. This conclusion is related to the similar example, which involves Apple Inc’s
support for Foxconn to undertake workers’ welfare by paying costs.
The gap in the literature review which fails to address social responsibility factors in
supply management decisions, only enhances our motivatation to further delve into
investigating decision models in supply management for firms who face the risk of supplier
irresponsibility. By introducing market factors that have not been previously considered
(Tang and Zhou 2012), we anticipate that this novel approach in studying supplier
selection and development problems will shed insight and increase awareness for this issue.
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CHAPTER III
Supplier Selection
3.1 Background
Most extant supplier selection works through linking the consumer requirements
with sustainability and purchasing decisions using quantitative approaches such as
multi-criteria decision making and analytical hierarchy process, they focus more on the
short-run gain trading off between the sourcing costs and ethical production without
considering potential switching costs afterward (Chan et al., 2008; Lee et al., 2009; Dai and
Blackhurst, 2012).
Supplier learning, the long-term advantage from supplier-buyer relationship, is
widely ignored in the context of sustainable supplier selection. It has long been observed
that unit production costs are decreased with cumulative production, known as
learning-by-doing, due to process improvements and/or technology advances (Yelle, 1979;
Argote and Epple, 1990). Learning by supplier, can restrict a firm from switching suppliers
even in event of social responsibility violations by suppliers. For example, Apple ended up
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still giving Foxconn the bulk of the production to Foxconn, though trying to shift supply
chain away to another contract manufacturer Pegatron, for its iPad Mini due to the low
yield rates with the new contractor (Dou, 2013).
“There’s a learning curve for any new products, so our yield rates are
increasing,” said Mr. Lin [Chief Financial Officer of Pegatron].
Therefore, the objective of our work is to answer this vital question about how social
responsibility and supplier learning affect a firm’s sourcing strategy. The review provides
an interesting lens for research, amidst the recent developments regarding unethical events
in the business world involving production practices at supplier factories of major firms.
Synthesis of the literature which indicates the lack of supplier selection models that
incorporate social factors, motivates us to integrate factors from the wide spectrum of
literature to present a model addressing the following questions:
1. If the contract supplier behaves unethically, should a firm continue contracting to
benefit from cost reduction through learning or switch to an ethical supplier? On the
other hand, should a firm continue with an ethical supplier or switch to a low cost
supplier and bear the risk of supplier’s unethical behavior?
2. What is the optimal supplier selection strategy for a firm when a supplier offers low
cost, but with risk of unethical behavior regarding social responsibility versus a
higher cost ethical supplier?
3. How do the three factors, the risk likelihood of an unethical event, the impact of the
event and the supplier learning, affect the supplier selection strategies?
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3.2 The Model
We consider a firm buying goods from two types of suppliers (subscript i = A,B),
different in their level of ethical production, to sell (or process first and then sell) in the
consumer market in a two-period horizon (subscript t = 1, 2). We assume in each of the
two periods, consumer willingness-to-pay for ethical production of the goods is uniformly
distributed between 0 and 1 and we normalize the market size of each period to 1. Such
construction leads to the linear inverse demand curve, p(q) = 1− q, where q is the quantity
sold. The initial costs to source from the two suppliers are linear in quantity, denoted by
cA and cB respectively. The product lifetime is assumed to be only one period, that is, the
firm cannot stock leftover goods from period 1 and sell them in period 2.
Unethical events: Disclosure or news outbreak of supplier’s unethical production
practices, such as a fire safety violation or abuse of child labor, may have the buying firms
face backlash from consumers. Experimental evidence from (Trudel and Cotte, 2009)
suggests that consumers demand a substantial discount from firms that produce goods in
an unethical manner. Their study also finds that while consumers reward ethical
production, they also punish unethical firms even more in terms of willingness-to-pay.
Therefore, we focus on the event of unethical production.
We assume the buying firm knows that, for supplier B, there is some risk likelihood
or probability θt (0 ≤ θt ≤ 1 and t = 1, 2) of its unethical production being disclosed to the
consumers. Given the clustering of suppliers and/or their sub-contractors and routine
audits of their factories, it is unlikely that the firm does not have some estimate of the
chance of an unethical event happening (Lahiri, 2012). The complement (1− θt)
corresponds to the probability of the alternative event, where there are no ethical
violations of any kind by the contracted supplier. As a benchmark and to not clutter the
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expressions for gleaning insights, we assume supplier A is ethical in production and thus
has zero probability of any unethical behavior.
Discount willingness-to-pay: When learning corporate’s unethical behavior through
the disclosure of such event, Trudel and Cotte (2009) find from their experimental studies
that consumers punish the firm by discounting their willingness-to-pay and thus,
demanding a lower price. For supplier B, we assume a discount factor δt (0 ≤ δt ≤ 1) on
the consumer willingness-to-pay and thus the discount price p = (1− δt)(1− q) with
probability θt. Alternatively, with probability 1− θt, there is no discount on demand
(δt = 0) when the consumers are not aware of unethical production. On the other hand, by
choosing the ethical supplier A, the buying firm can secure its demand curve with no
exposure to the risk of unethical behavior.
Supplier learning : Should the buying firm continue sourcing from the same supplier
across periods, the supplier accumulates knowledge and experience from learning, thus
reducing production costs over time (Lewis and Yildirim, 2002; Gray, Tomlin, and Roth,
2009). This cost reduction by supplier is often bargained by the buyer through lower prices
as time progresses (Kalwani and Narayandas, 1995). Hence, similar to Kim (2003), we use
contract periods as a proxy of cumulative production quantity, which in the learning
literature is correlated with the learning effect (Yelle, 1979; Argote and Epple, 1990). We
consider a learning factor, αi, in supplier i’s production which would result in a reduced
cost of (1− αi)ci if the firm continues with supplier i for another period. On the other
hand, we do not incorporate fixed costs associated with switching suppliers as its effect is
intuitive and mostly captured by the loss of learning in our model. Similar assumption has
been made in some outsourcing studies (Gray et al., 2009; Li and Wang, 2010), where the
firm has to select between a low cost offshore production and a high cost domestic
production. The events happen in the following sequence as depicted in Figure 1:
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events for Supplier Selection
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At the beginning of period 1, the firm decides which supplier to source from at a
linear unit cost ci (i = A,B). To avoid a trivial solution, we assume cA > cB so the
unethical supplier B costs less. If supplier B is chosen, then unethical production is
disclosed with probability θ1, and that discounts the firm’s demanding price to
p = (1− δ1)(1− q). We also assume the firm has the flexibility to adjust order quantity
after the breakout of the unethical news, which may be due to contract agreement, a rather
powerful buying firm, or a reasonably long season remained after the disclosure.
Alternatively, with probability (1− θ1), the consumers would not be aware of any unethical
sourcing and pay the non-discount price p = 1− q. On the other hand, if supplier A is
selected, then the firm bears no risk and always asks for the non-discount price. We can
summarize the firm’s first period profit function as follows:
pi1i(q|Θ1) =

[(1− δ1)(1− q)− cB] q if i = B and Θ1 = θ1
[(1− q)− cB] q if i = B and Θ1 = 1− θ1
[(1− q)− cA] q if i = A and Θ1 = ·
(3.1)
where Θ1 indicates the realization of first period event with “·” representing irrelevance
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when the ethical supplier A is chosen. The firm realizes profit by producing q in a given
period. To ensure q ≥ 0, we assume that 1− δ1 ≥ cB in the presence of an unethical event.
In period 2, the firm’s profit function would depend on both the first and second period
decisions as summarized below:
pi2j(q|Θ1,Θ2)
=

[(1− δ2)(1− q)− (1− αB)cB] q if j = B given i = B,Θ1 = θ1, Θ2 = θ2 = 1
[(1− δ2)(1− q)− (1− αB)cB] q if j = B given i = B,Θ1 = 1− θ1, Θ2 = θ2
[(1− q)− (1− αB)cB] q if j = B given i = B,Θ1 = 1− θ1, Θ2 = 1− θ2
[(1− q)− cA] q if j = A given i = B,Θ1 ∈ {θ1, 1− θ1}, Θ2 = ·
[(1− q)− (1− αA)cA] q if j = A given i = A,Θ1 = ·, Θ2 = ·
[(1− δ2)(1− q2B)− cB] q if j = B given i = A,Θ1 = ·, Θ2 = θ2
[(1− q)− cB] q if j = B given i = A,Θ1 = ·, Θ2 = 1− θ2
(3.2)
where Θ2 indicates the realization of second period event and 1− δ2 ≥ (1− αB)cB to
ensure q ≥ 0. Note that, although the first and second expressions are the same, the
sample routes are different. The first scenario corresponds to an unethical event in period 1
(Θ1 = θ1) and continuing negative impact in period 2 (Θ2 = θ2 = 1; with no uncertainty).
Here, from the consumer psychology perspective (Brunk and Blmelhuber, 2011), we assume
the negative impact continues, as consumer perception towards unethicalness once formed
is resistant to change over time. The second scenario corresponds to no unethical event in
period 1 (Θ1 = 1− θ1) and unethical event in period 2 (Θ2 = θ2; with uncertainty).
With the above introduced notation, we can express the expected total profit
function under each supplier selection alternative as:
Πij = EΘ1 [pi1i(q|Θ1) + EΘ2 [pi2j(q|Θ1,Θ2)]] (3.3)
ΠBj(Θ1) = EΘ1
[
pi1B(q|Θ1) + EΘ2 [pi2j(Θ1)(q|Θ1,Θ2)]
]
(3.4)
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We use Πij to denote the total profit for the policy ij when supplier i is selected in
period 1 and supplier j is selected in period 2; similarly ΠBj(Θ1) denotes the profit if B is
selected in period 1, but in period 2 the choice of supplier j(Θ1) is contingent on the
realization of the event Θ1. Note that there exists no such contingent policy Aj(Θ1), as A
is an ethical supplier with no event realization if chosen in period 1. We summarize all
admissible policies in Table I. The term “short-term policy” refers to the case in which the
firm contracts with a supplier for exactly one period and then switches, while in the
“long-term policy,” the firm continues to contract with the same supplier across two
periods.
Table I: Admissible Supplier Selection Policies
Label Policy Period 1 Choice Period 2 Choice
BB Long-term contract with B Choose unethical supplier B Continue with B
AA Long-term contract with A Choose ethical supplier A Continue with A
AB Short-term switching contract with A then B Choose ethical supplier A Switch (downgrade) to B
BA Short-term switching contract with B then A Choose unethical supplier B Switch (upgrade) to A
Bj(Θ1) Contingent/Dynamic contract Choose unethical supplier B
{
Switch to A if unethical event realized (Θ1 = θ1)
Continue with B, otherwise (Θ1 = 1− θ1)
3.3 Analysis
3.3.1 Base Model
In this section, we consider the base model in which the two parameters, the
probability of an unethical event and the discount willingness-to-pay are constant across
time periods, i.e., θ1 = θ2 = θ and δ1 = δ2 = δ. We also let the production learning rate be
equal for both suppliers, i.e., αA = αB = α. The selection process allows the buying firm to
switch suppliers between the two periods. We start by characterizing the second period
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results, and solve the first period problem through backward induction.
Proposition 1. Given the contract supplier in period 1 is i, the selection decision for the
buying firm in period 2 can be characterized as follows:
(a) For i = B and Θ1 = θ in period 1, choose B in period 2 if cB ≤ C¯B, otherwise choose
A.
(b) For i = B and Θ1 = 1− θ in period 1, choose B in period 2 if cB ≤ C¯B, otherwise
choose A.
(c) For i = A in period 1, choose B in period 2 if cB ≤ ¯¯CB, otherwise choose A.
Proof. All proofs and expressions for cB cutoffs are provided in the Appendix.
When B is the contract supplier in period 1, Proposition 1 (i) and (ii) show the
cutoffs below which the firm stays with B depends on the realization of the event in period
1: in particular, C¯B is a special case of C¯B with θ = 1 as we assume the impact of an
unethical event would linger for another period. For the scenarios (ii) and (iii) in which no
unethical behavior is observed, the learning-driven cost reduction rate (1− α) is applied
toward to cB and cA respectively. Hence the difference between C¯B and
¯¯
CB exists if and
only if α > 0. Proposition 2 and Figure 2 depict the behavior of cost cut-offs with respect
to the three factors, θ, δ, and α.
Proposition 2. (a) C¯B and
¯¯
CB are decreasing in θ.
(b) C¯B, C¯B and
¯¯
CB are decreasing in δ.
(c) C¯B and C¯B (
¯¯
CB) are increasing (decreasing) in α.
Figure 3(a) shows that cut-offs C¯B and
¯¯
CB are decreasing with the increase in the
likelihood of an unethical event θ. The firm would require lower costs to offset the decrease
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Figure 2: Comparative Statics on Second Period cB Cutoffs (cA = 0.6)
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(a) Cutoffs vs. θ(δ=0.4,α=0.1)
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(c) Cutoffs vs. α(θ=0.4,δ=0.4)
in their consumer demand in the presence of higher risk likelihood with supplier B. When
an unethical event is realized in the first period, the negative impact continues in the next
period which means θ = 1 and hence C¯B does not change with θ. As expected, C¯B
degenerates to C¯B at θ = 1. For small θ, C¯B can be greater than cA because of the learning
factor α, which gives supplier B a competitive advantage in receiving a renewal contract.
In Figure 3(b), the effect of the discount factor δ is greater on C¯B than on C¯B
because θ = 1 in the case of C¯B and the discount in willingness-to-pay persists if an
unethical event was observed in period 1. With a record of unethical behavior as in C¯B, the
savings in cost may not justify the tremendous lost due to high impact so the buying firm
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will favor and switch to supplier A. Lastly, while the learning in continuing with B allows
higher pre-adjusted cost cutoffs (C¯B and C¯B), the learning with A discourages the firm
from switching to supplier B by imposing a lower cost cutoff (
¯¯
CB) as shown in Figure 3(c).
To summarize the second period outcomes, the firm would prefer the unethical
supplier if the lower sourcing cost along with the benefit from learning or long-term
relationship could offset the increase in risk. After characterizing the firm’s optimal second
period choice given Θ1, we next solve for the optimal policy to adopt in period 1 as in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. (a) For α > αˆ, adopt BB policy if cB ≤ CˆB, otherwise adopt AA.
(b) For α ≤ αˆ, where αˆ satisfies C¯B = C˜B = CˆB,
(i) adopt BB policy if cB ≤ C¯B,
(ii) adopt Bj(Θ1) if C¯B < cB ≤ C˜B, and
(iii) adopt AA if cB > C˜B.
Proposition 3 identifies a learning threshold level αˆ, above which the optimal policy
is to enact a long-term contract, either BB or AA, depending on the sourcing cost cB
relative to the cutoff CˆB, jointly determined by the parameters, θ, δ, α, and cA. The
intuitive reason for only signing up long-term contracts under high learning rate as in part
(a) is that switching supplier in period 2 loses the benefit of learning αcj, which cannot be
compensated by bearing no risk (BA or Bj(Θ1)) or lowered sourcing cost cB in the case of
AB. On the other hand, at low learning rate (α ≤ αˆ), it can now be beneficial for the firm
to let go of the small gain in learning but have the option to change the supplier. For
subsequent analysis and discussion, since our focal point is to study the impact of unethical
behavior, we downplay the role of the learning rate α so that it does not significantly
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dominate the other two unethical factors θ and δ in the decision-making process as in the
case of part (b).
Figure 3 plots the expected profits for each of the five possible strategies at different
cB values for θ=0.4, δ=0.4, α=0.1 (<αˆ=0.31), and cA=0.6. The envelope of these curves
depicts the optimal selection strategies to adopt, as characterized in Proposition 3(b). The
first period results of the base model glean several important managerial insights toward
selecting supplier with potential risk of unethical behavior:
Figure 3: Expected Profits of Different Policies
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First, the profits of the two short-term switching policies, BA and AB, are the same
since no learning occurs when switching to the other supplier and thus the two periods are
essentially decoupled. More importantly, these two policies are never optimal suggesting
that the switching decision should not be made a priori as it loses the flexibility and
potential gain through learning from staying with the original supplier.
Second, the above reasoning naturally leads to the dynamic or contingent policy
Bj(Θ1) to take advantage of the flexibility in postponing the second period decision until
the event Θ1 is realized. It is only when an unethical event occurs would the firm switch or
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upgrade to supplier A, otherwise the firm should stay with supplier B and take advantage
from learning and lower cost. Such apolicy is optimal only for intermediate cB values
between C¯B and C˜B as characterized in Proposition 3(b)(ii). Note that the dynamic policy
is only viable for choosing B in the first period which allows two possible outcomes, while
selecting A bears no risk of an unethical event and thus requires no contingency plan.
Third and lastly, in the cases when cB takes the extreme values as in Proposition
3(b) (i) cB ≤ C¯B and (iii) cB ≥ C˜B, the long-term contracts, BB or AA, are the best
policies. In these two cases, the cost differences between the two suppliers and the
advantage of learning warrant a long-term contract.
Proposition 4. (i) C˜B, CˆB (C¯B) are decreasing (increasing) in α.
(ii) C˜B and CˆB are decreasing in θ.
(iii) C˜B, CˆB and C¯B are decreasing in δ.
Proposition 4 shows how the three policy-setting cutoffs C¯B, C˜B and CˆB are affected
by the three key factors θ, δ, and α. Except for the positive effect of α on C¯B as the firm is
able to take higher cB due to learning when forming a long-term contract with B, all
cutoffs are decreasing in the parameters as demonstrated in Figure 4 (with cA fixed at 0.6).
In Figure 5(a), we illustrate the effect of learning factor α on the choice of optimal
supplier selection policy for θ = 0.4 and δ = 0.4. As expected from Proposition 3, the cB
range in which the contingent policy Bj(Θ1) is optimal is decreasing in α and eventually
for high α, the firm is left with no choice but the long-term contract with either B or A. In
Figure 5(b) and 5(c), we therefore set α = 0.1(< αˆ=0.31) to illustrate how θ δ affect the
selection strategy.
As one may expect, when cB increases, the optimal policy changes from BB,
Bj(Θ1), to AA; or directly from BB to AA. However, while the cB range (C˜B − C¯B) in
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Figure 4: Comparative Statics on First Period cB Cutoffs (cA = 0.6)
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(c) Cutoffs vs. δ(θ=0.4, α=0.1)
which Bj(Θ1) is optimal is diminishing in the risk likelihood θ, it is increasing in the
discount factor δ. With high θ, an unethical event is likely to happen in both periods so
the demand is discounted in most circumstances if staying with B. So only if cB is
sufficiently low would the firm choose the BB policy to offset the loss in discount;
otherwise, it is optimal to simply choose the long-term AA policy. The dynamic policy
Bj(Θ1) is no longer optimal because it becomes almost like BA as the firm would mostly
likely switch from B to A when θ is high (and exactly BA if θ = 1). On the other hand,
with low θ, though it is unlikely that an unethical event will take place, but when it does
happen in period 1, the effect of an unethical event persists, i.e., Θ2 = θ2 = 1 if
Θ1 = θ1 = 1. Therefore, the contingent policy Bj(Θ1) does benefit the firm in the rare
23
event of unethical behavior but in most cases, it is like the BB policy because of low θ. In
contrast, when δ is low, switching or not does not matter as much as in the case when the
discount is high and the firm will lose the benefit of learning if switch from B to A. Hence,
it is only with high δ that the firm would utilize Bj(Θ1).
Next, we examine the joint effect of any two of the three on the firm’s selection
strategy. The following figures demonstrate optimal policies the firm should adopt when
weighing between flexibility (Bj(Θ1)) and long-term learning benefit (BB or AA).
Figure 5: Optimal Policies as a Function of θ, δ and α (cB = 0.4, cA = 0.6)
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(a) Effect of θ and δ (α = 0.1)
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(c) Effect of δ and α (θ = 0.4)
In Figure 6(a), while the observations for the high-θ-high-δ and low-θ-low-δ regions
are not surprising (AA and BB), the interaction between the likelihood and impact is not
symmetric when one is low while the other is high. At low discount δ, regardless of the risk
likelihood θ, which includes high θ, the firm would favor BB as the impact is small though
likely to happen. On the other hand, when θ is low, the firm may use the contingent policy
Bj(Θ1) for high δ to avoid being tied up with the unethical supplier B and let the negative
impact persists. Therefore, to the firm, the two main factors θ and δ are not on a
one-to-one tradeoff basis, and the ethical long-term contract AA is never an optimal policy
if only one of the two unethical parameters θ or δ is high with cB being reasonably low.
Figure 6(b) and 6(c) illustrate how the learning rate α moderates the effect of the
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risk on the choice of optimal policy. In both figures, it is again shown that high α would
favor a long-term contract BB if θ or δ is low, and AA otherwise. When significant
learning is not presented as in low α, the observations are analogous to those in Figure 5(b)
and 5(c) that the contingent policy is desired at low θ or high δ.
Next we discuss three variants of our base model, each of which represents a
relaxation of one key factor: αA 6= αB, θ1 6= θ2, and δ1 6= δ2. In Section 3.3.2, we
demonstrate that the insights gleaned from the base model hold true even when the
learning rates are not the same between the suppliers. In Section 3.3.3, however, when the
risk likelihood or the impact varies in time, the optimal policies may take up to two
additional forms.
3.3.2 Supplier-Specific Learning
In this section, we consider the case in which the learning rates are different between
the suppliers, i.e., αA 6= αB. Using Proposition 1 (with αB replacing α in C¯B and C¯B and
αA replacing α in
¯¯
CB) and solving for the optimal policy in period 1 backwardly as in
Proposition 3, we find similar yet interesting results as illustrated in Figure 6.
Overall, the difference in the learning rates does not require additional form in terms
of optimal policy, like BA or AB, but it does alter the preference among the three existing
forms: BB, AA, and Bj(Θ1). As the learning rate with one supplier increases, so does the
preference to the corresponding long-term contract, as depicted by the change of AA region
in Figure 7(a) and BB in Figure 7(b). Such preference is more sensitive to αA than αB
because the base cost is higher with the ethical supplier A (cA > cB). Furthermore, the
preference between BB and Bj(Θ1) is only affected by αB because in neither case would
the learning with A occur. While lower learning rates make the long-term contracts less
attractive, it does not necessarily imply that the short-term switching contracts like BA or
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Figure 6: Optimal Policies as a Function of θ and δ with Nonidentical α’s (cB = 0.4, cA =
0.6)
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AB would become the best choice but rather just a better alternative. With constant risk
likelihood and discount rate across periods, the contingent policy Bj(Θ1) would
outperform the short-term switching policy BA when B is the better supplier to go with
and no unethical event is observed.
3.3.3 Time-Dependent Risk Likelihood or Impact
In this section, we extend our base model to account for the time dependence of the
two unethical factors, i.e. θ1 6= θ2 or δ1 6= δ2. Using Proposition 1 (with θ2 replacing θ or δ2
replacing δ in all three cutoffs C¯B, C¯B and
¯¯
CB) and solving backwardly the first period
problem as stated in Proposition 3, we find the optimal policy may take any form of the
five admissible policies as described in Table I.
Figure 7 demonstrates the effect of the risk likelihood and discount factors on the
optimal policy employed for the same set of parameter values used in earlier numerical
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Figure 7: Optimal Policies as a Function of θ2 or δ2 (α = 0.1, cA = 0.6)
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(b) Effect of δ2 (θ = 0.4, δ1 = 0.4)
examples (θ1 = δ1 = 0.4, α = 0.1, cA = 0.6). We first examine in Figure 8(a) how the
change in the second period risk likelihood θ2 affects the choice of optimal policy. We
observe that for intermediate cB, the firm would favor the short-term switching policy AB
at extremely low θ2, while BA is preferred at extremely high θ2. This happens because, as
θ2 approaches the low or high values, the benefit of postponing the second period decision
by adopting Bj(Θ1) is diminishing. At extreme θ2 values, supplier B in period 2 becomes
almost either ethical or unethical. In the former case of an ethical B in period 2 (low θ2),
the firm would prefer AB to BB or Bj(Θ1) as choosing B in the first period, the firm
might lose the chance of having an ethical B if an unethical event happens in period 1. In
the latter case of an unethical B in period 2 (high θ2), the firm would be better off just
switching to A in period 2 for otherwise the discount would happen almost surely.
We expect similar observations when varying the second period discount δ2 but
because of the choice of the base parameters, it does not show up in Figure 8(b). To
illustrate how the differentiated discount factors influence the optimal policies and compare
27
the effects between the risk likelihood and impact factors, we choose the exogenous
parameter values so that each possible policy appears.
Figure 8: Optimal Policies as a Function of θ2 or δ2 (α = 0, cA = 0.6)
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(b) Effect of δ2 (θ = 0.6, δ1 = 0.2)
By having no learning (α = 0), medium-high risk likelihood (θ1 = 0.6), and low
discount (δ1 = 0.2), in Figure 8, we examine the case where all five admissible policies can
take place whether varying θ2 or δ2. The main difference between the two figures is the
utilization of the contingent policy Bj(Θ1). In Figure 9(a), as θ2 deviates from the base
value θ1 (= 0.6), the short-term policies AB and BA are becoming more prominent that
replace the contingent policy because the benefit of Bj(Θ1) is diminishing at extremely low
or high θ2 values. On the other hand, in Figure 9(b), though both AB and BA are
presented as the discount factor δ2 varies, it is Bj(Θ1) that helps mitigate the impact, in
particular at high δ2.
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3.4 Summary
Within the context of social responsibility, our work investigates the effect of three
factors on supplier selection decisions: the risk likelihood of an unethical event, the impact
of the event, and the supplier learning.
Our study on supplier selection gleans several important insights for the long-run
strategy in selecting between ethical and cheap unethical suppliers. Contingent policy,
where the firm switches to ethical supplier only if an unethical event happens, can be
optimal when either the risk likelihood is low or the impact is high. In the case of Disney,
soon after the deadly events happened, it asked licensees producing in Bangladesh to end
production to protect the value of the brand. Long-term policies, where the firm stays with
the same supplier, are optimal at high learning rates whether or not the rates are different
between the suppliers. Even a series of suicidal tragedies did not stop Apple from sourcing
its iDevices from Foxconn as other contract manufacturers had difficulties to produce
Apple’s products due to the growing complexity. For some other firms, like Fairphone,
while at higher costs, they contract only with ethical suppliers to avoid the risk of having
an impact from social irresponsibilities.
Our results show that for strategic sourcing, a firm should not myopically look at
only short-term cost saving but also long-term economical profit and reputation from a
social responsibility perspective. Furthermore, only if the risk likelihood or impact may
change dramatically over time would the short-term switching policies be optimal, where
the firm either always switches from ethical to unethical supplier, or reversely. It is worth
noting that as stated on its official website, Disney would consider Bangladesh and other
barred countries again only if meaningful improvements on work conditions are
demonstrated (The Walt Disney Company, 2014).
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CHAPTER IV
Supplier Development
4.1 Background
With a rise in reports pertaining to supplier violations along with stringent
regulations from governmental agencies and mounting customer pressure are urging firms
to engage in supplier improvement programs. For instance, after the building collapse in
Bangladesh, three types of safety development programs were utilized by firms (Butler,
2013) with firms signing up for long-term safety programs. However, some firms stuck to
their existing programs by choosing to not enter into safety agreements and stuck to their
existing programs citing higher costs. On the other hand, firms may also choose to manage
their risk by sourcing through intermediaries such as Li & Fung Ltd. for better
collaboration and compliance of social and environmental regulations.
In the instance of social responsibility violations by suppliers, firms generally need to
invest in repair activities in the form of payment or penalties to governmental agencies and
additional training programs. For example, after a spate of incidents in China and
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Bangladesh, rise in wages at Foxconn are shared by Apple Inc. (Ruwitch, 2012), whereas
firms using suppliers in Bangladesh also signed pacts to invest in additional supplier
development activities as precautionary measures based on these events. In January 2010,
Walmart Inc. decided to enter into an open-ended sourcing arrangement with Li & Fung
Ltd. (Belavina and Girotra, 2012), but recently it cut ties with the company. Like other
firms are discovering, sourcing through third parties is quickly rising because firms expect
the intermediary to take responsibility for risks such as, safe working conditions, and no
violations of human rights. We summarize key differences in supplier development
programs in Table II motivated by the safety agreement plans in Bangladesh, and use of
intermediaries for sourcing.
Table II: Types of Supplier Development
BANGLADESH
SAFETY
ACCORD
ALLIANCE FOR
BANGLADESH
WORKER
SAFETY
THIRD-PARTY
SUPPLIER
DEVELOPMENT
Contract Type Legally binding Not legally binding Agreement with
Third-party
Scope 7-tier suppliers 5-tier suppliers All suppliers
Funding
Responsibility
Required At will Third-party
Cost Up to $500,000 a
year
Up to $1,000,000 a
year
Undisclosed
Contribution Relative to produc-
tion volume
Relative to produc-
tion volume
None
Implementation Independent and
transparent
Not independent Third-party
Participants Approximately
150 companies
from more than 15
countries
Companies predomi-
nantly from the U.S.
JCPenney, Kohl’s,
Sears, etc.
Governance Jointly governed
by companies and
NGO’s
Governed only by
corporations
Governed by third-
party
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Lee, O’Marah, and Geraint (2012) from the SCM (Supply Chain Management)
World survey of chief supply chain officers and executives that, although supply shortages,
shipping disruptions, and supplier financial failures are concerns for supply chain risks,
more than half of the respondents were now concerned with supplier responsibility
problems. In closely related literature, both Guo, Lee, and Swinney (2014) and Chen and
Lee (2014) consider risk management from social responsibility context, but they do not
address supplier development which we explicitly study in the model while also including
the consumer perspective.
We know from the discussion in Chapter 2 that supplier development is an
important decision for a firm, as it directly relates to a firm’s supply chain performance,
given consumer’s interest towards social responsibility is rising. Additionally, recent
developments following the incidents in Bangladesh and the subsequent safety programs
that are being adopted by firms as stated in II motivate us to study the supplier
development problem. Therefore, we develop a model addressing the following questions:
1. What is the optimal supplier development strategy for a firm between a legally
binding program and a non-binding program when the costs, the risk likelihood of
supplier unethical behavior are different?
2. Whether or not a firm should choose to not participate in any supplier development
program, and bear the risk of unethical behavior?
3. How do the three factors, the risk likelihood, the penalty cost realized from unethical
event, and finally the discount in the price affect firm’s development strategies?
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4.2 The Model
Consider a firm buying goods from a supplier who is not completely ethical. Hence,
the firm may undertake supplier development activities either to comply with regulations,
or to preserve its reputation. We model three types of development programs; the first, a
direct and binding type of development program, the second, an indirect type of supplier
development in which the firm utilizes intermediaries or third-parties and lastly, a
non-binding type of development program.
Once the firm chooses direct or binding type of development, then it commits to
investment and participation in the duration of the program. On the contrary, when the
firm uses a third-party provider to implement improvement programs at the supplier, the
relationship is of not binding in nature. Therefore, we use ‘D’ for D irect supplier
development program and ‘T ’ for T hird-party (intermediary) development program.
Alternatively, the firm may choose to have N on-binding development program which we
represent using ‘N ’.
Without loss of generality, we assume the cost for the firm in choosing N as cN = 0,
while for T and D the firm pays cT and cD respectively. We model the firm’s selection of
the supplier development in a two-period setting (subscript t=1, 2). Once, the decision has
been made, the firm then sells a fixed production quantity q to the market at a unit price
of p. The product lifetime is assumed to be one period, that is, the firm cannot stock
leftover goods from period 1 and sell them in period 2.
Unethical events: Disclosure or news outbreak of the supplier’s unethical production
practices, such as a fire safety violation or abuse of child labor, may have the buying firms
face backlash from consumers. Experimental evidence from Trudel and Cotte (2009)
suggests that consumers demand a substantial discount from firms that produce goods in
33
an unethical manner. Their study also finds that while consumers reward ethical
production, they also punish unethical firms even more in terms by demanding a discount
in the price p. Therefore, we focus on the event of unethical production.
We assume that, for each supplier development type i = N,D, T , there is some risk
likelihood or probability θi (0 ≤ θi ≤ 1) of supplier unethical production being disclosed to
the consumer. The complement (1− θi) corresponds to the probability of the alternative
event, where there are no ethical violations by the supplier. Given the clustering of
suppliers and/or their sub-contractors and routine audits of their factories, it is unlikely
that the firm does not have some estimate of the chance of an unethical event happening
(Lahiri, 2012). As the firm in our model is sourcing from the supplier who is not perfectly
ethical, in the case of non-binding type of supplier development, i.e., for N , the risk
probability is always greater in comparison to D and T . Therefore, we assume θN > θD
and θN > θT .
Discount in price: When learning corporate’s unethical behavior through the
disclosure of such event, Trudel and Cotte (2009) find from their experimental studies that
consumers punish the firm by demanding a lower price.We assume a discount factor
δ(0 ≤ δ ≤ 1) on the price and thus the discount price is (1− δ)p, when an event is realized
with probability θ. Empirical evidence suggests that, a firm will always be held accountable
for supplier’s unethical behavior by its consumers and only the severity of the violation can
change accountability (Hartmann and Moeller, 2014). Therefore, when an event occurs in
our model, consumers punish the firm by discounting the price by a factor δ since the firm
sells one type of product at price p. Alternatively, with probability 1− θ, there is no
discount on demand (δ = 0) when the consumers are not aware of unethical production.
Penalty cost: In the event that the firm experiences supplier violations, it invests in
recovery or mitigation efforts such as payment or penalties to governmental agencies,
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Figure 9: Sequence of Events for Supplier Development
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subsidizing supplier’s labor costs, and investing in additional supplier training and safety
programs. For example, Bartlett, Dessain, and Sjman (2006) estimated that various
supplier noncompliance issues cost the global furniture retailer IKEA millions of dollars in
the 1990’s. We model this cost as ∆c when a violation occurs at the supplier. Apple shared
costs with its supplier Foxconn, when they raised employee wages following reports of low
wages and underage interns (Ruwitch, 2012). More recently, various firm signed agreements
for safety and training programs following fatal accidents at their supplier factories in
Bangladesh. We can assume that, in the event the firm does not pay penalty cost ∆c, it
would experience an increase in the risk of supplier unethical behavior in the next period
because the firm would not be able to repair its reputation.
The events happen in the following sequence as depicted in Figure 9:
At the beginning of period 1, the firm selects a supplier development program
(i = N,D, T ) at a unit cost of ci. If the firm experiences supplier violations with a risk
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probability θi, the price p will be discounted to (1− δ)p. The firm then sells a fixed
quantity in the market, obtaining a profit of (1− δ)p− ci. Alternatively, when there is no
unethical event realization, there will be no discount δ=0.
At the beginning of period 2, the firm makes another selection in supplier
development (j = N,D, T ) at a cost of cj per unit. Note that when i = D, then j = D,
since the direct supplier development is binding in nature.
Additionally, the firm incurs the penalty cost ∆c if an unethical event happens with
the probability θi in the first period. The firm pays the penalty cost to restore the
reputation and thereby restoring the probability θj to θi in the second period. Hence, the
firm bears the cost ∆c at the beginning of period 2. The probability of an unethical event
happening is dependent on whether or not the firm pays the penalty cost, and hence the
firm may bear the maximum risk probability of θN=1 in period 2 if it does not invest in
repair activities following an unethical event in a non-binding type of program.
We denote the selection in period as j = N
′
when i = N and the firm continues to
participate in non-binding supplier development program with the risk likelihood of
θj = θN=1. For a binding or direct type of supplier development program, the firm has to
pay penalties in accordance with the agreement, while for a third-party development type
the costs are absorbed by the intermediary or the third-party. We can summarize the
firm’s first period profit function as follows:
pi1i(Θ1) =
 (1− δ)p− ci if i = T,D,N and Θ1 = θip− ci if i = T,D,N and Θ1 = 1− θi (4.1)
where Θ1 indicates the realization of the first period event and Θ2 indicates the realization
of the second period event. The firm’s second period profit function of second period based
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on both the first and second period decisions summarized as follows:
pi2j(Θ1,Θ2) =

p if j = N given i = N, Θ1 = 1− θN , Θ2 = 1− θN
(1− δ)p if j = N given i = N, Θ1 = 1− θN , Θ2 = θN
p− cT if j = T given i = N, Θ1 = 1− θN , Θ2 = 1− θT
(1− δ)p− cT if j = T given i = N, Θ1 = 1− θN , Θ2 = θT
(1− δ)p if j = N ′ given i = N, Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = θN ′ = 1
p−∆c if j = N given i = N, Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = 1− θN
(1− δ)p−∆c if j = N given i = N, Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = θN
p− (cT + ∆c) if j = T given i = N, Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = 1− θT
(1− δ)p− (cT + ∆c) if j = T given i = N, Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = θT
p if j = N given i = T, Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT}, Θ2 = 1− θN
(1− δ)p if j = N given i = T, Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT}, Θ2 = θN
p− cT if j = T given i = T, Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT}, Θ2 = 1− θT
(1− δ)p− cT if j = T given i = T, Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT}, Θ2 = θT
p− cD if j = D given i = D, Θ1 = 1− θD, Θ2 = 1− θD
(1− δ)p− cD if j = D given i = D, Θ1 = 1− θD, Θ2 = θD
p− (cD + ∆c) if j = D given i = D, Θ1 = θD, Θ2 = 1− θD
(1− δ)p− (cD + ∆c) if j = D given i = D, Θ1 = θD, Θ2 = θD
(4.2)
With the above introduced notation, we can express the expected total profit function
under each alternative as follows. Note that these alternatives are for general case in which
j = N,N ′, D, T .
Πij = EΘ1 [pi1i(Θ1) + EΘ2 [pi2j(Θ1,Θ2)]] (4.3)
ΠTj(Θ1) = EΘ1
[
pi1T (Θ1) + EΘ2 [pi2j(Θ1)(Θ1,Θ2)]
]
(4.4)
ΠNj(Θ1) = EΘ1
[
pi1N(Θ1) + EΘ2 [pi2j(Θ1)(Θ1,Θ2)]
]
(4.5)
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Πij denotes the total profit for the policy ij, when i is the development choice in
period 1 and j in period 2; while ΠNj(Θ1) denotes the profit if N is the decision in period 1,
but in period 2 the choice of development j(Θ1) is contingent on the realization of the event
Θ1. Similarly, ΠTj(Θ1) represents the total profit if T is the choice in period 1, and in period
2 the choice of development j(Θ1) is again contingent on the realization of the event Θ1.
We denote ΠNN ′ as a special case of dynamic policy that represents the profit of the
firm for i = N , while j is based on the realization of θi. When θi is realized, then j = N
′
,
and when no event is realized, then i = j = N . ΠNj′ (Θ1) on the other hand represents the
profit of the firm for i = N , while j is based on the realization of θi. When θi is realized,
then j = N
′
, and when no event is realized, then j = T . We summarize all admissible
policies in Table III. The term “short-term policy” refers to the case in which the firm
adopts a supplier development type for exactly one period and then switches, while the
“long-term policy,” refers to the policy in which the firm continues with the same selection
across both periods.
Table III: Admissible Supplier Development Policies
Policy Period 1 Choice Period 2 Choice
TT (Long-term) T T
DD (Long-term) D D
NT (Switching) N Switch to T
TN (Switching) T Switch to N
NN (Long-term) N N
NN
′
(Long-term) N
{
Continue with N if no unethical event realized
Continue with N
′
, otherwise
Nj
′
(Θ1) (Contingent) N
{
Switch to T if no unethical event realized
Continue with N
′
, otherwise
Nj(Θ1) (Contingent) N
{
Switch to T if no unethical event realized
Continue with N, otherwise
Tj(Θ1) (Contingent) T
{
Switch to N if no unethical event realized
Continue with T, otherwise
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4.3 Analysis
The decision tree in Figure 10 for the model depicts all alternatives over the
two-period time horizon. We start by characterizing the second period results, and solve
the first period problem through backward induction.
Figure 10: Decision Tree for Supplier Development
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Proposition 5. Given the development choice in period 1 is ‘i’, the decision for the buying
firm in period 2 can be characterized as follows.
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(a) For i = N and Θ1 = 1− θN in period 1, choose T in period 2 if
cT ≤ C¯T ≡ δp(θN − θT ), otherwise choose N .
(b) For i = N and Θ1 = θN in period 1,
(i) When ∆c ≤ δp(1− θN), if cT ≤ C¯T , choose T in period 2, otherwise choose N .
(ii) When ∆c > δp(1− θN), if cT ≤ C¯T ≡ δp(1− θT )−∆c, choose T in period 2,
otherwise choose N
′
.
(c) For i = T and Θ1 = 1− θT in period 1, choose T in period 2 if cT ≤ C¯T , otherwise
choose N .
(d) For i = T and Θ1 = θT in period 1, choose T in period 2 if cT ≤ C¯T , otherwise choose
N .
Proof. All proofs and expressions for cT cutoffs are provided in the Appendix.
When N is the firm’s supplier development decision in period 1, Proposition 5 (a)
and (b) show the cutoffs below which the firm switches to T depending on the realization
of the event in period 1. C¯T is the cutoff, below which the firm switches to T in
Proposition 5 (a) and (b) (i). Below C¯T , the firm switches to T as seen in Proposition 5 (b)
(ii). Note that the cutoff does not depend on the realization of the event, if C¯T < C¯T .
Proposition 5 (b) define a threshold in the penalty cost ∆c, that defines the ranking of C¯T
and C¯T . At C¯T lower than C¯T , the firm switches to T below C¯T , otherwise it continues
with N
′
. When T is the firm’s decision in period 1, the firm will switch to N above the
cutoff C¯T that does not depend on the realization of event in period 1.
To summarize the second period outcomes, for low ∆c (< δp(1− θN)) values and low
cT values, T is the optimal choice while at higher ∆c values, the firm requires lower cT
values to choose T , to offset the ∆c = 0 in choosing N
′
. After characterizing the firm’s
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optimal second period choice given Θ1, we next solve for the optimal policy to adopt in
period 1 as stated in Proposition 6.
Proposition 6. (1) For ∆c ≤ δp(1− θN)
(i) when cT ≤ C¯T , adopt TT , if cT ≤ C˜T ≡ cD + δp(θD − θT ) + ∆cθD2 , else DD.
(ii) when cT > C¯T ,
(a) Given cD ≤ C˜D ≡ 2δp(θN−θD)+∆c(θN−θD)2 , adopt TN if
cT < C˜
II
T ≡ 2cD + 2δpθD − δp(θT + θN) + ∆cθD, else DD.
(b) Given cD > C˜D, adopt TN if cT < C˜
I
T ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + ∆cθN , else NN .
(2) For ∆c > δp(1− θN)
(i) when cT ≤ C¯T , adopt TT , if cT ≤ C˜T ≡ cD + δp(θD − θT ) + ∆cθD2 , else DD.
(ii) when cT > C¯T ,
(a) Given cD ≤ CˆD ≡ δpθN (3−θN )−θD(2δp+∆c)2 , adopt TN if cT < C˜IIT , else DD.
(b) Given cD > CˆD, adopt TN if cT < CˆT ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + δpθN(1− θN), else
NN
′
.
Proof. All proofs and expressions for cT cutoffs are provided in the Appendix.
Proposition 7. C˜IT , C˜
II
T , and C˜T are increasing in ∆c.
(i) When ∆c < ∆c
′
= 2δp(θN−θD)−2cD
(θD−θN ) , then C˜
I
T ≤ C˜IIT .
(ii) When ∆c < ∆c
′′
=
3δpθN−δpθ2N−2cD−2δpθD
θD
, then C˜IIT ≤ CˆT .
Proposition 6 (1) considers scenarios for all range of cT values when the penalty cost
∆c is lower than the threshold δp(1− θN), and Proposition 6 (2) considers scenarios for all
range of cT values above δp(1− θN). We begin by examining the joint effect of ∆c and cT
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Figure 11: Comparative Statics w.r.t. ∆c
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
CT 
∆c 
tn vs dd
tn vs NN'
tn vs NN
tt vs dd
∆c' ∆c'' 
TCˆ
I
TC
~
II
TC
~
TC
~
on optimal policies, keeping all other parameters constant. We know that DD is a binding
policy, and hence in Proposition 6 (1), C˜D is the threshold below which DD is optimal
instead of NN , while in Proposition 6 (2), CˆD is the threshold below which DD is optimal
instead of NN
′
.
For given values of δ=0.6, p=0.9, θN=0.6, θT=0.2, θD=0.5, and cD=0.2, Figure 12
demonstrates that for low values of cT , the static policy TT is the optimal choice for all ∆c
values. At low cT , the firm has an additional advantage in terms of the penalty cost.
Therefore, TT is optimal at all range of ∆c values.
For intermediate range of cT and ∆c values, the static switching policy TN is
42
Figure 12: Optimal Policies as a Function of ∆c and cT (θD = 0.5, cD = 0.2)
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optimal. If the firm’s penalty cost is low, NN is optimal instead of TN , as the firm would
pay high cost cT (cN=0) in a TN policy. As cT becomes larger, only one of the static
policies NN , NN
′
, or DD is optimal for a firm that depend on the threshold in cD. When
the penalty cost ∆c is low along with high cost cT , then a long-term policy with NN is
optimal. At high penalty cost ∆c, choosing NN
′
is optimal, but the firm experiences a
maximum risk likelihood of unethical event θN=1. On the other hand, the binding policy
DD optimal at low θD and cD, as cT increases further.
Next, we change the parameters θD and cD in order to see how the optimal policies
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Figure 13: Optimal Policies as a Function of ∆c and cT (θD = 0.4, cD = 0.1)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
CT
∆c
NN'
TT
TN
DD
change, especially at large cT values. In Figure 13, the results are similar to 12 except that
at high cT values, DD is optimal at low range of ∆c values, since θD and cD are both
lower. Further, when ∆c increases, the lower cost and the lower risk of unethical event in
choosing DD does not offset the high penalty cost and it is rather optimal to choose NN
′
.
Reducing values of θD and cD further, the firm is more likely to choose DD, as seen in
Figure 14. As we further reduce cD, DD becomes optimal dominating both NN and NN
′
as seen in Figure 15. Since NN and NN
′
are not optimal for any ∆c, the firm may adopt
TN only when the penalty cost is high.
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Figure 14: Optimal Policies as a Function of ∆c and cT (θD = 0.3, cD = 0.1)
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We observe that the long-term policies are optimal at extreme values of cT , while
the static switching policy TN is optimal for low-to-medium range values of cT and ∆c.
Although TN may become optimal for low ∆c values, the likelihood of choosing TN is
lower when the penalty cost is below the threshold (∆c ≤ δp(1− θN)). Note that, for TN
to be optimal, the firm requires to have a low cost cT as well as significant amount of
savings from period one in the penalty cost with a high risk probability. If the cost cT is
very low, then the long-term policy TT is optimal for the firm. Hence, the switching policy
TN is optimal for small range of parameter values.
The alternate switching policy NT is not optimal for any parameter values, as
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Figure 15: Optimal Policies as a Function of ∆c and cT (θD = 0.3, cD = 0.05)
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long-term policies are optimal at extreme values of cT and TN at intermediate range of cT .
In the NT policy, the firm would pay the penalty cost ∆c when an unethical event is
realized in period 1 and bear Similarly, Nj
′
(Θ1) is never optimal because the firm would
bear the risk of unethical event across both periods. Specially, in period 2, the firm bears
the maximum risk likelihood of unethical event (θN=1) while switching to T when no event
is realized in period 1 will only increase the cost for the firm.
Overall, as cT and ∆c vary, the optimal policies change from TT , TN to either one
of NN , NN
′
or DD. Note that, we observe the switching policy TN only when the risk
differential between T and N is not large, else the long-term policies are optimal for the
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firm. At high range of cT values, the firm chooses between long-term policies NN , NN
′
and DD. At a combination of large ∆c and medium-to-high (θD and cD), long-term
non-binding policies NN or NN
′
are optimal. When the risk likelihood and the cost in
choosing direct (binding) development D are relatively low, the long-term policy DD is the
optimal decision for the firm.
Corollary 1. (i) C˜T , C˜
I
T , C˜
II
T , and CˆT are decreasing in θT .
(ii) C˜IT and CˆT are increasing in δ.
(iii) C˜T is increasing (decreasing) in δ, if θD > θT (θD < θT ).
(iv) C˜IIT is increasing (decreasing) in δ, if θD − θT > θN − θD (θD − θT < θN − θD).
Corollary 1 depicts the variability of period one cutoffs with respect to θT and δ. All
cutoffs in cT above are derived according to which the firm chooses between TT , DD, NN ,
and NN
′
. Hence, as the risk likelihood of unethical event increases in choosing T , the firm
would require lower costs in cT .
C˜IT is increasing with δ from Corollary 1 (ii) suggests that the firm can bear higher
costs in cT , because we know the discount in price δ is the same in TN and NN policies,
while the ranking of the risk probabilities is θN > θT . Similarly, for the cutoff CˆT above
which NN
′
becomes optimal over TN for the firm, CˆT increases with δ due to the
assumption that θN > θT . Therefore, the firm is likely to choose development policy TN
with increase in the δ in order to offset the higher risk of unethical event.
From Corollary 1 (iii), C˜T is increasing in δ, when θD is greater than θT as the firm
would prefer long-term policy TT even at higher costs in order to avoid high risk in the
binding policy DD. On the contrary, when the risk in choosing T is higher, the threshold
C˜T below which TT is optimal decreases as the firm would require lower costs to offset the
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higher risk. Next, in Corollary 1 (iv), the threshold C˜IIT below which the firm chooses TN
over DD increases with δ when the cost differential between D and T (θD-θT ) is greater
than the differential between N and T (θN -θD). With increase in δ, the firm is more likely
to choose TN when θD − θT > θN − θD. In the alternative case, the firm requires lower
costs in cT to choose TN and hence C˜
II
T decreases with δ.
Figure 17(a) and Figure 17(b) show the opposite effect from the discussion based on
Corollary 1.
Figure 16: Comparative Statics w.r.t. δ
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(a) θD=0.5, cD=0.2
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(b) θD=0.4, cD=0.1
Based on the Corollary 1 (i), we evaluate the joint effect of θT and cT . All cutoffs in
cT are decreasing in θT , given other parameters are held constant. We choose parameters
δ=0.6, p=0.9, θN=0.5, θD=0.3, and cD=0.15 for the purpose of the analysis. In the Figure
18(a), we notice that for low range of cT and θT values the long-term policy TT is optimal
for the firm. For intermediate values of cT and θT , the switching policy TN is optimal
while for high range of values, NN becomes optimal. Since all cutoffs in cT are decreasing
with θT , the shape of the optimal areas show the linear relationship of cut-offs in the
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Figure 18(b). The optimal policies are based on the ranking of cutoffs from the Proposition
6 as well as on the range of ∆c values.
In Fig 17, we observe the effect of θT and cT on the firm’s optimal policies. We
choose parameters δ=0.6, p=0.9, θN=0.5, θD=0.3, and cD=0.15 for the purpose of the
analysis. We observe that optimal policies change from TT to TN , and then to NN when
we choose ∆c = 0.2 in the Figure 18(a). For an increase in ∆c in the Figure 18(b), the
long-term policy NN
′
becomes optimal instead of NN at high cT and tT as the firm might
bear the maximum risk by not investing in repair activities following an unethical event.
But, when the cost cD decreases as seen in the Figure 18(c), the binding policy DD is
optimal at high cT and θT values. Altogether, we see the transition of optimal policies from
TT at low θT , to TN at medium range of θT , and to a long-term policy between NN , NN
′
or DD at high θT .
Next, we examine the joint effect of δ and cT on the optimal supplier development
policies. We use parameter values of p=0.9, θN=0.5, θT=0.2, θD=0.3, cD=0.1, and ∆c=0.2
for analysis in Figure 18. For low range of δ and cT values, we notice that TT is not always
optimal. When δ is close to 0, the switching policy TN is optimal for any slight increase in
cT because the discount in the price is so low that the firm may bear a risk in period 2 by
switching to N and still benefit from the penalty costs ∆c with the third-party from period
1. As cT increases further at low discount δ values, the long-term policy NN
′
is optimal,
while at high discount δ there is a high risk probability of the discount (θN=1) that makes
the binding policy DD optimal. The long-term policy NN may also be optimal at high cD
values, when the risk probability in the policy NN offsets the high cost and the risk
likelihood in the DD policy as seen in Figure 19.
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Figure 17: Optimal Policies as a Function of θT and cT
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
CT
θT
TT
TN
NN
(a) θD=0.3, cD=0.15, ∆c=0.2
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(b) θD=0.3, cD=0.15, ∆c=0.3
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(c) θD=0.3, cD=0.1, ∆c=0.2
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Figure 18: Optimal Policies as a Function of δ and cT (θD=0.3, cD=0.1)
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4.4 Alternative Model
The model discussed in the Section 4.3 considers three alternatives N , N
′
, T , when
an unethical event is realized in period one with probability θN . A new alternative model is
worthwhile to study, when the firm has to pay the cost of ∆c in the form of penalties or an
investment that is mandatory according to an existing agreement with the supplier or local
governmental agencies which rules out the development type N
′
. The firm may now switch
to T or continue with N , in the event of a violation by the supplier by paying the cost ∆c.
The sequence of events for the alternative model follow as per the Figure 21.
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Figure 19: Optimal Policies as a Function of δ and cT (θD=0.3, cD=0.2)
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4.4.1 Analysis
The decision tree for the alternative model shows the supplier development model
over the two-period time horizon as seen in Figure 20.
For the alternative model, the events happen in the sequence as depicted in Figure
??:
We start by characterizing the second period results, and then solve the first period
problem through backward induction.
Proposition 8. Given the development choice in period 1 is ‘i’, the decision for the buying
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Figure 20: Decision Tree for Supplier Development-Alternate Model
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Figure 21: Sequence of Events for Supplier Development-Alternative Model 
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firm in period 2 can be characterized as follows.
(a) For i = N and Θ1 = 1− θN in period 1, choose T in period 2 if
cT ≤ C¯T ≡ δp(θN − θT ), otherwise choose N .
(b) For i = N and Θ1 = θN in period 1, choose T in period 2 if cT ≤ C¯T , otherwise choose
N .
(c) For i = T and Θ1 = 1− θT in period 1, choose T in period 2 if cT ≤ C¯T , otherwise
choose N .
(d) For i = T and Θ1 = θT in period 1, choose T in period 2 if cT ≤ C¯T , otherwise choose
N .
Proof. All proofs and expressions for cT cutoffs are provided in the Appendix.
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When N is the firm’s supplier development decision in period 1, Proposition 8 (a)
and (b) show the cutoffs below which the firm switches to T depending on the realization
of the event in period 1. C¯T is the cutoff, below which the firm may continue with T , else
switch to N as seen in Proposition 8 (c) and (d). In the alternative model, all supplier
development decisions in period 2 do not depend on the realization of period 1 event. We
also know that if the supplier development decision is D in period 1, the firm would
continue with the same development type across both periods because it is binding type.
To summarize the second period outcomes, for low cT values, T is the optimal
decision while at high cT , the non-binding supplier development type N is optimal. After
characterizing the firm’s optimal second period, we next solve for the optimal decision to
adopt in period 1 as stated in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. (i) For cT ≤ C¯T
(a) when cT ≤ C¯T , adopt TT , if cT ≤ C˜T ≡ cD + δp(θD − θT ) + ∆cθD2 , else DD.
(ii) For cT > C¯T
(a) Given cD ≤ C˜D ≡ 2δp(θN−θD)+∆c(θN−θD)2 , adopt TN if
cT < C˜
II
T ≡ 2cD + 2δpθD − δp(θT + θN) + ∆cθD, else DD.
(b) Given cD > C˜D, adopt TN if cT < C˜
I
T ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + ∆cθN , else NN .
Corollary 2. When ∆c < ∆c
′
= 2δp(θN−θD)−2cD
θD−θN , then C˜
I
T ≤ C˜IIT .
Proposition 9 considers all possible scenarios based on the cutoff C¯T . We begin by
examining the joint effect of ∆c and cT on optimal policies, keeping all the other
parameters constant. We know that DD is a stand alone binding policy, and hence for the
purpose of analysis the parameters θD and cD are chosen such that DD does not dominate
every feasible policy. We note that NN
′
is not a feasible policy in the alternative model
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since the firm would pay the penalty cost ∆c in case an unethical event is realized with θN
in period 1.
Corollary 3. (i) C˜T , C˜
I
T , and C˜
II
T are decreasing in θT .
(ii) C˜IT is increasing in δ.
(iii) C˜T is increasing (decreasing) in δ, if θD > θT (θD < θT ).
(iv) C˜IIT is increasing (decreasing) in δ, if θD − θT > θN − θD (θD − θT < θN − θD).
Corollary 3 shows the comparative statics of period 1 cutoffs with the three
parameters δ and θT . We have the same results, as seen from the Corollary 1.
Next, we examine the joint effect of ∆c and cT on optimal policies in Figure 22 at
given values of δ=0.6, p=0.9, θN=0.6, θT=0.2, θD=0.5, and cD=0.2. At low cT , the
long-term policy TT is optimal at all ∆c values. For medium range of ∆c values and cT
values, TN is optimal.
With increase in cT , TN becomes optimal as the cost cT becomes high that does not
offset the low risk θN . The long-term policy NN is optimal, when both cT and ∆c are at
high. Interestingly, NN is optimal even at low ∆c values, as the firm would benefit from
low penalties and take advantage of the low cost in the non-binding type of policy NN . In
Figure 23, when θD and cD are both reduced DD becomes optimal instead of NN . Finally,
when we further reduce the values of θD and cD in Figure 24, the long-term policy DD
becomes optimal even at low range of cT values.
Based on the Corollary 3 (i), we evaluate the joint effect of θT and cT . Similar to the
model in 4.3, all cutoffs in cT are decreasing in θT , given other parameters are held
constant. We choose parameters δ=0.6, p=0.9, θN=0.5 for the analysis. In the Figure 25,
the results observed are similar to ones observed in Figure 18(a) from the analysis of the
primary model.
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Figure 22: Optimal Policies as a Function of ∆c and cT for Alternate Model (θD=0.5,
cD=0.2)
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We notice that, for low range of cT and θT values the firm would choose the
long-term policy TT . The switching policy TN optimal for intermediate range values of θT
and cT , while for high range of values, NN becomes optimal. Since all cutoffs are in cT and
are decreasing with θT , the shape of the optimal areas seen in Figure 26 show the linear
relationship of cut-offs.
We observe the optimal policies transition from TT to TN , and then to DD policies
when we choose cD=0.2. As we change cD values, once again TT is optimal at a
combination of low cT and θT as seen in the Figure 26, while the TN is optimal for small
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Figure 23: Optimal Policies as a Function of ∆c and cT for Alternate Model (θD=0.4,
cD=0.1)
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range of the combination of intermediate range of values. For high range of cT and θT , we
notice the long-term policy DD becomes optimal when cD decreases. Altogether, we see the
transition of policies from TT to TN , and then to a long-term policy between NN or DD.
Next, we examine the joint effect of δ and cT on the optimal policies a firm can
employ. We use parameter values of p=0.9, θN=0.5, θT=0.2, and ∆c=0.2 for analysis in
Figure 28(a) and Figure 28(b). For low range of cT values, we notice that TT is not always
optimal similar to the analysis of the primary model. When δ is close to 0, the firm may
switch to TN for any slight increase in cT , since the δ is so low that the firm can bear the
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Figure 24: Optimal Policies as a Function of ∆c and cT for Alternate Model (θD=0.3,
cD=0.05)
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risk in period 2 by switching to N and benefit from low cost. But, if the discount δ
becomes large, then the firm would choose TT , since the low cost in choosing N does not
offset the high discount δ as seen in Figure 28(a).
As δ increases further at medium range of cT values, DD is optimal after it reaches
a threshold above which the low cost does not offset the high discount for the firm. Up on
increasing the cD as seen in Figure 28(b), we observe that the firm would choose NN
instead of DD for medium-to-high range of cT and δ.
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Figure 25: Optimal Policies as a Function of θT and cT for Alternate Model (θD=0.3,
cD=0.15, ∆c=0.2)
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4.5 Summary
In the context of social responsibility, our model investigates the effect of the three
factors on a firm’s supplier development decision: the risk likelihood of an unethical event,
the impact of the event, and the penalty cost.
Our model generates insights for a firm to choose between three strategies for
developing an unethical supplier; first, the binding type of development program, second, a
non-binding type of development program, and lastly, the third-party type of development
program.
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Figure 26: Optimal Policies as a Function of θT and cT for Alternate Model (θD=0.3,
cD=0.1, ∆c=0.3)
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Summarizing the results from the analysis of Section 4.3 and 4.4.1, we find that it is
optimal for the firm to choose a third-party supplier development program, if the cost is
low. Interestingly, it is also optimal for the firm to source through intermediaries even at
higher risk likelihood since on realization of any event, the penalty costs serve as an
insurance for the firm. This may explain the rising popularity of use of third parties for
sourcing, in which the firm may benefit from the penalty cost. But, a firm may still switch
to a non-binding type of program if cost incurred through intermediary is high and(or) the
risk in sourcing through third-party is not significantly lower.
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Figure 27: Optimal Policies as a Function of δ and cT
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(a) Optimal Policies as a Function of δ and cT for
Alternate Model (θD=0.3, cD=0.1)
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(b) Optimal Policies as a Function of δ and cT for
Alternate Model (θD=0.3, cD=0.2)
On the other hand, firms may choose to participate in a binding type of supplier
development program if the costs and risks are lower to offset any penalty cost it may incur
upon realization of unethical event. The binding policy is preferred when costs in choosing
the third-party program are larger, but the risk in a non-binding type of development is
also too high. The cost for a firm in the binding type of supplier improvement program
may be higher or lower compared to outsourcing the risk to a third-party or an
intermediary. But, in order to make an optimal decision, a firm should consider other
factors such as the risk and the discount in the price by the consumer.
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CHAPTER V
Conclusion
While many companies are increasingly paying attention to social responsibility
issues, most of the extant quantitative research mainly focuses on the environmental
measure (Tang and Zhou, 2012). Within the context of social responsibility, our work
investigates the effect of two important factors on supplier selection and development
decisions: the risk likelihood of an unethical event and the impact of the event from the
consumer perspective.
Our results show that for strategic sourcing and supplier development, a firm should
not myopically look at only short-term cost saving but also long-term economical profit
and reputation from a social responsibility perspective. As Porter (2006) suggests,
companies should secure long-term economic performance by avoiding short-term behavior
that is socially irresponsible. Our results reiterate that firms should rather foresee the
long-run economic and social performance, even though the investment may be high in
order to preserve their reputation. According to results from a survey conducted with chief
supply chain officers in 2013, companies invest in social and environmental responsibility
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for a positive image of their brand or company is one of the top three reasons along with
the aim of improving cost efficiency and government regulations (Lee et al., 2013). The fact
that many companies have joined The Bangladesh Accord or the Alliance for Bangladesh
Worker Safety, that requires them to contribute up to $1,00,000 an year indicates that
firms are investing for long-run performance (The Accord, May 2013).
In a more holistic view, this study addresses the gap in the literature by studying
the supply management problem in social responsibility context by taking market factors
into account. The supplier selection model along with supplier development model can
provide comprehensive solutions in decision making for firms.
In our work, we did not model the reward for ethical activities but instead focused
on the stronger negative impact for unethical events as observed in the experimental study
by (Trudel and Cotte, 2009). However, our model can be easily modified to investigate the
positive effect of ethical behavior on supplier selection by changing the impact from
negative discount to positive premium. It may also yield additional insights by considering
a generalized case in which both suppliers are unethical but differ in the attributes, e.g.,
high risk likelihood and low impact v.s. low likelihood and high impact. The use of
intermediaries for sourcing and development are on the rise, and hence we incorporate this
into our supplier development model. Future research could include co-operation and
competition between firms in supply management decisions, when sourcing from a common
supplier.
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APPENDIX
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APPENDIX A
Supplier Selection
A.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. For each of the scenarios in the firm’s profit function in the second
period (B.1), it is straightforward to show the optimal quantity q∗ is in the form of
[1−(δ2)]−[1−(αj)]cj
2[1−(δ2)] where the discount (δ2) takes place if an unethical event happens (Θ2 = θ2)
and the learning α occurs if the same supplier is used, j = i. Therefore, given j, Θ1 and
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Θ2, substituting q = q
∗ in (B.1) leads to the firm’s profit for each scenario in period 2:
pi2j(Θ1,Θ2) =

[(1−δ2)−(1−αB)cB ]2
4(1−δ2) if j = B given i = B,Θ1 = θ1, Θ2 = θ2 = 1
[(1−δ2)−(1−αB)cB ]2
4(1−δ2) if j = B given i = B,Θ1 = 1− θ1, Θ2 = θ2
[1−(1−αB)cB ]2
4
if j = B given i = B,Θ1 = 1− θ1, Θ2 = 1− θ2
(1−cA)2
4
if j = A given i = B,Θ1 ∈ {θ1, 1− θ1}, Θ2 = ·
[1−(1−αA)cA]2
4
if j = A given i = A,Θ1 = ·, Θ2 = ·
[(1−δ2)−cB ]2
4(1−δ2) if j = B given i = A,Θ1 = ·, Θ2 = θ2
(1−cB)2
4
if j = B given i = A,Θ1 = ·, Θ2 = 1− θ2
(A.1)
Using (A.1), we can then express the expected profit for period 2 as follows:
EΘ2 [pi2j(Θ1,Θ2)]
=

[(1−δ2)−(1−αB)cB ]2
4(1−δ2) if j = B given i = B,Θ1 = θ1
(1− θ2) · [1−(1−αB)cB ]24 + θ2 · [(1−δ2)−(1−αB)cB ]
2
4(1−δ2) if j = B given i = B,Θ1 = 1− θ1
(1−cA)2
4
if j = A given i = B,Θ1 ∈ {θ1, 1− θ1}
[1−(1−αA)cA]2
4
if j = A given i = A,Θ1 = ·
(1− θ2) · (1−cB)24 + θ2 · [(1−δ2)−cB ]
2
4(1−δ2) if j = B given i = A,Θ1 = ·
(A.2)
The expressions above are for the general case as described in the modeling section. For
the base model, however, we would have αA = αB = α, θ1 = θ2 = θ, and δ1 = δ2 = δ.
(i) For i = B and Θ1 = θ in period 1, the firm would stay with B (otherwise, switch to A)
iff (if and only if) EΘ2 [pi2B(θ,Θ2)] ≥ EΘ2 [pi2A(θ,Θ2)]⇐⇒ cB ≤ C¯B ≡ 1−δ1−α
(
1− 1−cA√
1−δ
)
.
(ii) For i = B and Θ1 = 1− θ in period 1, the firm would stay with B (otherwise, switch
to A) iff
EΘ2 [pi2B(1− θ,Θ2)] ≥ EΘ2 [pi2A(1− θ,Θ2)]⇐⇒ cB ≤ C¯B ≡ 1−δ(1−α)(1−δ+δθ)(1−
√
1−∆1),
where ∆1 =
(1−δ+δθ)
1−δ [1− δθ − (1− cA)2].
67
(iii) For i = A in period 1, the firm would switch to B (otherwise stay with A) iff
EΘ2 [pi2B(·,Θ2)] ≥ EΘ2 [pi2A(·,Θ2)]⇐⇒ cB ≤ ¯¯CB ≡ 1−δ(1−δ+δθ)
(
1−√1−∆2
)
, where
∆2 =
(1−δ+δθ)
1−δ [1− δθ − (1− (1− α)cA)2].
Proof of Proposition 2. The comparative statics can be derived through employing implicit
differentiation on EΘ2 [pi2B(1− θ,Θ2)] = EΘ2 [pi2A(1− θ,Θ2)] (characterizing C¯B):
∂C¯B
∂θ
=
−4(1−δ)
(
[1−(1−α)C¯B ]
2
4
− [(1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B ]
2
4(1−δ)
)
2(1−α)((1−θ)(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C¯B]+θ[(1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B])
≤ 0
The numerator is negative because it is the difference between the discounted and
non-discounted profits with B, while the denominator is clearly negative as all three
parameters θ, δ, and α vary between 0 and 1.
∂C¯B
∂δ
=
−
(
(1−θ)[1−(1−α)C¯B]2+2θ[(1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B]−(1−cA)2
)
2(1−α)((1−θ)(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C¯B]+θ[(1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B])
≤
−4
(
(1−θ) [1−(1−α)C¯B ]
2
4
+θ
[(1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B ]
2
4(1−δ) −
(1−cA)2
4
)
2(1−α)((1−θ)(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C¯B]+θ[(1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B])
= 0
The numerator is negative since the inequality holds as 2 ≥ (1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B
1−δ , and by the
definition of C¯B.
∂C¯B
∂α
=
2θC¯B[(1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)C¯B[1−(1−α)C¯B]
2(1−α)[(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−(1−α)C¯B)+θC¯B((1−δ)−(1−α)C¯B)]
≥ 0
The numerator is obviously negative. Since C¯B(δ, α) is a special case of C¯B with θ = 1, all
comparative statics of C¯B follow by replacing the above derivations with θ = 1. Similarly,
by employing implicit differentiation on EΘ2 [pi2B(·,Θ2)] = EΘ2 [pi2A(·,Θ2)] (characterizing
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¯¯
CB), we have
∂
¯¯
CB
∂θ
=
−4(1−δ)
 (1− ¯¯CB)2
4
− [
(1−δ)− ¯¯CB]
2
4(1−δ)

2
(
(1−θ)(1−δ)(1− ¯¯CB)+θ
[
(1−δ)− ¯¯CB
]) ≤ 0
∂
¯¯
CB
∂δ
=
−
(
(1−θ)(1− ¯¯CB)2+2θ
[
(1−δ)− ¯¯CB
]
−[1−(1−α)cA]2
)
2
(
(1−θ)(1−δ)(1− ¯¯CB)+θ
[
(1−δ)− ¯¯CB
])
≤
−4
(1−θ) (1− ¯¯CB)2
4
+θ
[(1−δ)− ¯¯CB]
2
4(1−δ) −
[1−(1−α)cA]2
4

2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1− ¯¯CB)+2θ((1−δ)− ¯¯CB)
= 0
∂
¯¯
CB
∂α
= −2(1−δ)cA[1−(1−α)cA]
2
(
(1−θ)(1−δ)(1− ¯¯CB)+θ
[
(1−δ)− ¯¯CB
]) ≤ 0
Proof of Proposition 3. Following the similar procedure deriving the optimal quantity q∗ in
the proof of Proposition 1, we can rewrite the first period profit function (3.1) as follows:
pi1i(Θ1) =

[(1−δ1)−cB ]2
4(1−δ1) q if i = B and Θ1 = θ1
(1−cB)2
4
if i = B and Θ1 = 1− θ1
(1−cA)2
4
if i = A and Θ1 = ·
(A.3)
Using (A.1) and (B.3) with αA = αB = α, θ1 = θ2 = θ, and δ1 = δ2 = δ, we can then
express the total expected profit functions (3.3) and (3.4) in period 1 as follows:
ΠBB = θ ·
(
[(1−δ)−cB ]2
4(1−δ) +
[(1−δ)−(1−α)cB ]2
4(1−δ)
)
+(1− θ) ·
(
(1−cB)2
4
+ θ [(1−δ)−(1−α)cB ]
2
4(1−δ) + (1− θ) [1−(1−α)cB ]
2
4
)
ΠAA =
(1−cA)2
4
+ [1−(1−α)cA]
2
4
ΠAB = ΠBA =
(1−cA)2
4
+ θ [(1−δ)−cB ]
2
4(1−δ) + (1− θ) (1−cB)
2
4
ΠBj(Θ1) = θ ·
(
[(1−δ)−cB ]2
4(1−δ) +
(1−cA)2
4
)
+(1− θ) ·
(
(1−cB)2
4
+ θ [(1−δ)−(1−α)cB ]
2
4(1−δ) + (1− θ) [1−(1−α)cB ]
2
4
)
(A.4)
The supplier choice in first period is either B or A, but the form of the resulting policy
(BB, AA, AB, BA, or Bj(Θ1)) depends on where cB stands in terms of the three second
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period cutoffs, C¯B, C¯B, and
¯¯
CB. Based on Proposition 2, there could be two possible
ranking cases: C¯B ≤ ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B and ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B ≤ C¯B. We consider all possible scenarios and
derive the optimal policies accordingly. In the former case of C¯B ≤ ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B,
• For cB ≤ C¯B ≤ ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B, the firm would always choose B in period 2 regardless of
the choice in period 1. Therefore, the firm would adopt BB (otherwise AB) iff
ΠBB ≥ ΠAB ⇐⇒ cB ≤ C¯ ′B ≡ 1−δ(1−α)(1−δ+δθ′)
(
1−
√
1− (1−δ+δθ′)
1−δ [1− δθ′ − (1− cA)2]
)
where θ′ = θ + θ(1− θ). By Proposition 2(i), cB ≤ C¯B ≤ C¯ ′B ≤ C¯B because
1 ≥ θ′ ≥ θ. So the optimal policy is BB.
• For C¯B ≤ cB ≤ ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B, the firm would adopt Bj(Θ1) (otherwise AB) iff
ΠBj(Θ1) ≥ ΠAB ⇐⇒ cB ≤ C¯B. So the optimal policy is Bj(Θ1).
• For C¯B ≤ ¯¯CB ≤ cB ≤ C¯B, the firm would adopt Bj(Θ1) (otherwise AA) iff
ΠBj(Θ1) ≥ ΠAA ⇐⇒ cB ≤ C˜B ≡ (1−θ)(1−δ)
2[1+(1−θ)(1−α)]
1+(1−θ)(1−α)2(1−δ+δθ)−δ
(
1−√1−∆3
)
, where
∆3 = 1− θ + (1−α)2θ1−θ + θ1−δ
(
(2− δ)− θ(1− cA)2 + [1− (1− α)cA]2 + (1−δθ)θ1−θ
)
. So
conditioned on C¯B ≤ C˜B, the optimal policy is Bj(Θ1) if cB ≤ C˜B, otherwise AA.
• For C¯B ≤ ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B ≤ cB, the firm would always choose A in period 2 regardless of
the choice in period 1. Therefore, the firm would adopt AA (otherwise BA) iff
ΠAA ≥ ΠBA ⇐⇒ cB ≥ ¯¯CB. So the optimal policy is AA.
In the latter case of
¯¯
CB ≤ C¯B ≤ C¯B,
• For cB ≤ ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B ≤ C¯B, the firm would always choose B in period 2 regardless of
the choice in period 1. Therefore, the firm would adopt BB (otherwise AB) iff
ΠBB ≥ ΠAB ⇐⇒ cB ≤ C¯ ′B. So the optimal policy is BB for the same reason as in
the first case.
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• For ¯¯CB ≤ cB ≤ C¯B ≤ C¯B, the firm would adopt BB (otherwise AA) iff
ΠBB ≥ ΠAA ⇐⇒ cB ≤ CˆB ≡ (1−δ)(2−α)θ+(1−θ)(1−δ)+(1−α)2[1−δ(1−θ)2](1−
√
1−∆4) where
∆4 =
(θ+(1−α)2[1−δ(1−θ)2]+(1−δ)(1−θ))((1−δ)θ(3−θ)+(1−θ)(2−θ)−(1−cA)2−[1−(1−α)cA]2)
(1−δ)(2−α)2 . So
conditioned on CˆB ≤ C¯B, the optimal policy is BB if cB ≤ CˆB, otherwise AA.
• For ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B ≤ cB ≤ C¯B, the firm would adopt Bj(Θ1) (otherwise AA) iff
ΠBj(Θ1) ≥ ΠAA ⇐⇒ cB ≤ C˜B. So conditioned on C¯B ≤ C˜B, the optimal policy is
Bj(Θ1) if cB ≤ C˜B, otherwise AA.
• For ¯¯CB ≤ C¯B ≤ C¯B ≤ cB, the firm would adopt AA (otherwise BA) iff
ΠAA ≥ ΠBA ⇐⇒ cB ≥ ¯¯CB. So the optimal policy is AA.
We note that in all scenarios, the switching policy BA or AB is never chosen so the
optimal policy is one of the three base policies BB, Bj(Θ1), and AA. Equating any two of
the three profit functions ΠBB, ΠBj(Θ1), and ΠAA then results in the characterization of the
three cost cutoffs C¯B, C˜B, and CˆB. Together with Proposition 4, it ensures that the three
cutoff curves intersect once and only at α = αˆ, below which C¯B ≤ C˜B, Bj(Θ1) is preferred
for cB in between; while above which C¯B > C˜B, therefore only BB and AA are
considered.
Proof of Proposition 4. By employing implicit differentiation on ΠBj(Θ1) = ΠAA
(characterizing C˜B), we have
∂C˜B
∂θ
=
−(1−δ)[(1−C˜B)2−(1−cA)2]−(1−δ)(1−2θ)
(
[1−(1−α)C˜B]2−[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]2
)
2θ[(1−δ)−C˜B]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−C˜B)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C˜B]+2(1−θ)θ(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]
+
−( 11−δ [(1−δ)−(1−α)(1−δ)C˜B ]2−[(1−δ)−C˜B ]2)
2θ[(1−δ)−C˜B]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−C˜B)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C˜B]+2(1−θ)θ(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]
≤ 0
∂C˜B
∂δ
=
−2(1−θ)θ(1−δ)[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]+(1−θ)θ[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]2−2θ(1−δ)[(1−δ)−C˜B]+θ[(1−δ)−C˜B]2
(1−δ)(2θ[(1−δ)−C˜B]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−C˜B)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C˜B]+2(1−θ)θ(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B])
≤ 0
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∂C˜B
∂α
=
−2(1−δ)cA[1−(1−α)cA]+2C˜B(1−θ)θ[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]+2(1−δ)C˜B(1−θ)2[1−(1−α)C˜B]
2θ[(1−δ)−C˜B]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−C˜B)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C˜B]+2(1−θ)θ(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]
≤ −2(1−δ)C˜B[1−(1−α)C˜B]+2C˜B(1−θ)θ[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]+2(1−δ)C˜B(1−θ)
2[1−(1−α)C˜B]
2θ[(1−δ)−C˜B]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−C˜B)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C˜B]+2(1−θ)θ(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]
=
−2(1−δ)C˜B[(2−θ)θ(1−(1−α)C˜B)−(1−θ)θ(1− 1−α1−δ C˜B)]
2θ[(1−δ)−C˜B]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−C˜B)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)C˜B]+2(1−θ)θ(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]
≤ 0
The numerators are negative because the assumption C˜B ≤ cA and substituting terms
using the C˜B characterization function ΠBj(Θ1) = ΠAA, while the denominators are clearly
positive since the parameters θ, δ, and α vary between 0 and 1.
Similarly, by employing implicit differentiation on ΠBB = ΠAA (characterizing CˆB),
we have
∂CˆB
∂θ
=
(
2(1−θ)[(1−δ)−(1−α)CˆB]2−2(1−θ)(1−δ)[1−(1−α)CˆB]2
)
−
(
(1−δ)(1−CˆB)2−[(1−δ)−CˆB]2
)
2θ[(1−δ)−CˆB]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−CˆB)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)CˆB]+2(2θ−θ2)(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)CˆB]
≤ 0
∂CˆB
∂δ
=
−2(1−θ)θ(1−δ)[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]+(1−θ)θ[(1−δ)−(1−α)C˜B]2−2θ(1−δ)[(1−δ)−C˜B]+θ[(1−δ)−C˜B]2
(1−δ)(2θ[(1−δ)−CˆB]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−CˆB)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)CˆB]+2(2θ−θ2)(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)CˆB])
≤ 0
∂CˆB
∂α
=
−2(1−δ)cA[1−(1−α)cA]+2CˆB(2θ−θ2)[(1−δ)−(1−α)hatCB ]+2CˆB(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)CˆB]
2θ[(1−δ)−CˆB]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−CˆB)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)CˆB]+2(2θ−θ2)(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)CˆB]
≤ −2(1−δ)CˆB(1−(1−α)CˆB)+2(2θ−θ
2)CˆB[(1−δ)−(1−α)CˆB]+2(1−θ)2(1−δ)CˆB[1−(1−α)CˆB]
2θ[(1−δ)−CˆB]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−CˆB)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)CˆB]+2(2θ−θ2)(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)CˆB]
=
−2(1−δ)(2θ−θ2)CˆB[(1−(1−α)CˆB)−(1− 1−α1−δ CˆB)]
2θ[(1−δ)−CˆB]+2(1−θ)(1−δ)(1−CˆB)+2(1−α)(1−θ)2(1−δ)[1−(1−α)CˆB]+2(2θ−θ2)(1−α)[(1−δ)−(1−α)CˆB]
≤ 0
The numerators are negative because the assumption CˆB ≤ cA and substituting terms
using the CˆB characterization function ΠBB = ΠAA, while the denominators are clearly
positive since the parameters θ, δ, and α vary between 0 and 1.
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APPENDIX B
Supplier Development
B.1 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 5 and 8. For each of the following scenarios in the firms’s profit
function in the second period, it is assumed that the adjusted production quantity q = 1,
and the profit can be expressed in the most general case, when unethical event is realized
(Θ2 = θj) as (1− δ)p− cj −∆c. Therefore, for given j, Θ1, and Θ2, we expand on profit of
period two and write the profit for each scenario in period 2 as:
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pi2j(Θ1,Θ2) =

p if j = N given i = N,Θ1 = 1− θN , Θ2 = 1− θN
(1− δ)p if j = N given i = N,Θ1 = 1− θN , Θ2 = θN
p if j = N given i = T,Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT}, Θ2 = 1− θN
(1− δ)p if j = N given i = T,Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT}, Θ2 = θN
(p−∆c) if j = N given i = N,Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = 1− θN
(1− δ)p−∆c if j = N given i = N,Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = θN
(1− δ)p if j = N given i = N,Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = θN = 1
p− (cT + ∆c) if j = T given i = N,Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = 1− θT
(1− δ)p− (cT + ∆c) if j = T given i = N,Θ1 = θN , Θ2 = θT
(p− cT ) if j = T given i = T,Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT} Θ2 = 1− θT
(1− δ)p− cT if j = T given i = T,Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT} Θ2 = θT
p− cD if j = D given i = D,Θ1 = 1− θD, Θ2 = 1− θD
(1− δ)p− cD if j = D given i = D,Θ1 = 1− θD, Θ2 = θD
p− (cD + ∆c) if j = D given i = D,Θ1 = θD, Θ2 = 1− θD
(1− δ)p− (cD + ∆c) if j = D given i = D,Θ1 = θD, Θ2 = θD
(B.1)
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Using (B.1), we can write the expected profit function for period 2 as follows
EΘ2 [pi2j(Θ1,Θ2)]
=

[(1− θN)p+ θN(1− δ)p] if j = N given i = N,Θ1 = 1− θN
[(1− θN)(p−∆c) + θN((1− δ)p−∆c)] if j = N given i = N,Θ1 = θN
[(1− θT )(p− cT ) + θT ((1− δ)p− cT )] if j = T given i = N,Θ1 = 1− θN
[(1− θT )(p− cT −∆c) + θT ((1− δ)p− cT −∆c)] if j = T given i = N,Θ1 = θN
[(1− θT )(p− cT ) + θT ((1− δ)p− cT )] if j = T given i = T,Θ1 ∈ {θT , 1− θT}
[(1− θD)(p− cD) + θD((1− δ)p− cD)] if j = D given i = D,Θ1 = 1− θD
[(1− θD)(p− cD −∆c) + θD((1− δ)p− cD −∆c)] if j = D given i = D,Θ1 = θD
(B.2)
• For i = N and Θ1 = 1− θN in period 1, the firm would switch to T (otherwise,
continue with N) iff (if and only if)
EΘ2 [pi2T (1− θN ,Θ2)] ≥ EΘ2 [pi2N(1− θN ,Θ2)]⇐⇒ cT ≤ C¯T ≡ δp(θN − θT ).
• For i = N and Θ1 = θN , the firm can choose between three alternatives N , N ′ and T .
Since we are determining the optimal decisions based on cutoffs in T , we first
determine the cutoffs in cT between T and N denoted by C¯T . Next, we determine the
cutoff between T and N
′
denoted by C¯T .
– The firm would switch to T (otherwise, continue with N) iff (if and only if)
EΘ2 [pi2T (θN ,Θ2)] ≥ EΘ2 [pi2N(θN ,Θ2)]⇐⇒ cT ≤ C¯T ≡ δp(θN − θT ).
– The firm would switch to T (otherwise, switch to N
′
) iff (if and only if)
EΘ2 [pi2T (θN ,Θ2)] ≥ EΘ2 [pi2N(θN ,Θ2 = θN = 1)]⇐⇒ cT ≤ C¯T ≡ δp(1− θT )−∆c.
Based on the above expressions for C¯T and C¯T , we derive a condition to rank
the cutoffs that would facilitate in choosing between three alternatives. For
C¯T − C¯T < 0, the condition ∆c < δp(1− θN) is true. And hence, when
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cT ≤ C¯T ≤ C¯T , the firm always chooses T . Alternatively, when ∆c > δp(1− θN),
the firm chooses T , when cT ≤ C¯T ≤ C¯T .
• For i = T and Θ1 ∈ {1− θT , θT} in period 1, the firm would continue with T
(otherwise, switch to N) iff (if and only if)
EΘ2 [pi2T (Θ1,Θ2)] ≥ EΘ2 [pi2N(Θ1,Θ2)]⇐⇒ cT ≤ C¯T ≡ δp(θN − θT ).
Proof of Proposition 6 and 9. Following the similar procedure from the proof of
Proposition 5, we can rewrite the first period profit function as follows:
pi1i(Θ1) =

p if i = N and Θ1 = 1− θN
(1− δ)p if i = N and Θ1 = θN
(p− cD) if i = D and Θ1 = 1− θD
(1− δ)p− cD if i = D and Θ1 = θD
(p− cT ) if i = T and Θ1 = 1− θT
(1− δ)p− cT if i = T and Θ1 = θT
(B.3)
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Using (B.3), we can express the total expected profit functions as follows
ΠNN = θN [(1− δ)p+ (1− θN)(p−∆c) + θN(1− δ)p−∆c)]
+(1− θN) [p+ (1− θN)p+ θN(1− δ)p]
ΠNN ′ = θN [(1− δ)p+ (1− δ)p)]
+(1− θN) [p+ (1− θN)p+ θN(1− δ)p]
ΠNj′ (Θ1) = (1− θN) [p+ (1− θT )(p− cT ) + θT ((1− δ)p− cT )]
+θN [(1− δ)p+ (1− δ)p]
ΠNj(Θ1) = (1− θN) [p+ (1− θN)p+ θN(1− δ)p]
+θN [(1− δ)p+ θT ((1− δ)p− cT −∆c) + (1− θT )(p− cT −∆c)]
ΠNT = θN [(1− δ)p+ (1− θT )(p− cT −∆c) + θT ((1− δ)(p− cT −∆c)]
+(1− θN) [p+ (1− θT )(p− cT ) + θT ((1− δ)p− cT )]
ΠTT = θT [(1− δ)p− cT + (1− θT )(p− cT ) + θT ((1− δ)p− cT )]
+(1− θT ) [(p− cT ) + (1− θT )(p− cT ) + θT ((1− δ)p− cT )]
ΠDD = θD [(1− δ)p− cD + (1− θT )(p− cD −∆c) + θT ((1− δ)p− cD −∆c)]
+(1− θD) [(p− cD) + (1− θD)(p− cD) + θD((1− δ)p− cD)]
ΠTN = θT [(1− δ)p− cT + (1− θN)p+ θN(1− δ)p]
+(1− θT ) [(p− cT ) + (1− θN)p+ θN(1− δ)p]
(B.4)
The development choice in the first period is either N , D or T , but the form of the
resulting policy depends on where cT stands in terms of the two second period cutoffs, C¯T
and C¯T . When ∆c < δp(1− θN), then C¯T ≤ C¯T , otherwise C¯T > C¯T . We note that DD is
a stand alone feasible policy in all scenarios. Therefore, we compare DD with all feasible
policies in each of the following cases and determine the optimal policies accordingly.
For cT ≤ C¯T ≤ C¯T , the firm would choose T (between T and N) in period 2
regardless of the choice in period 1. Then, the three possible policies are TT , NT , and DD.
• The firm would adopt TT (otherwise DD) iff ΠTT ≥ ΠDD ⇐⇒
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cT < C˜T ≡ cD + δp(θD − θT ) + ∆cθD2 .
• The firm would adopt TT (otherwise NT ) iff ΠTT ≥ ΠNT ⇐⇒
cT ≤ δp(θN − θT ) + ∆cθN ≡ C¯T + ∆cθN . Therefore, ΠTT ≥ ΠNT and NT is never the
optimal policy.
For C¯T ≤ cT ≤ C¯T , the firm would choose N in period 2 if Θ1 = 1− θN , else
switches to T . Then the three possible policies are TN , NN and DD.
• The firm would adopt TN (otherwise NN) iff ΠTN ≥ ΠNN ⇐⇒
cT < C˜
I
T ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + ∆cθN .
• The firm would adopt TN (otherwise DD) iff ΠTN ≥ ΠDD ⇐⇒
cT < C˜
II
T ≡ 2cD − δp(θN − θT )− δp(θN − θD) + ∆cθD.
• The firm would adopt DD (otherwise NN) iff ΠDD ≥ ΠNN ⇐⇒
cD < C˜D ≡ 2δp(θN−θD)+∆c(θN−θD)2 .
For C¯T ≤ C¯T ≤ cT , the firm would choose the type N in period 2 regardless of the
choice in period 1. Then, the three possible policies are TN , NN and DD.
• The firm would adopt TN (otherwise NN) iff ΠTN ≥ ΠNN ⇐⇒
cT < C˜
I
T ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + ∆cθN .
• The firm would adopt TN (otherwise DD) iff ΠTN ≥ ΠDD ⇐⇒
cT < C˜
II
T ≡ 2cD + 2δpθD − δp(θT + θN) + ∆cθD.
• The firm would adopt DD (otherwise NN) iff ΠDD ≥ ΠNN ⇐⇒
cD < C˜D ≡ 2δp(θN−θD)+∆c(θN−θD)2 .
When ∆c > δp(1− θN), then C¯T ≥ C¯T , there will be new admissible policies NN ′ ,
and a dynamic Nj
′
(Θ1) along with TT and DD.
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For cT ≤ C¯T ≤ C¯T , the three feasible policies are TT , DD, and NT .
• The firm would adopt TT (otherwise DD) iff ΠTT ≥ ΠDD ⇐⇒
cT < C˜T ≡ cD + δp(θD − θT ) + ∆cθD2 .
• The firm would adopt TT (otherwise NT ) iff ΠTT ≥ ΠNT ⇐⇒
cT <≡ δp(θN − θT ) + ∆cθN ≡ C¯T + ∆cθN . Therefore, ΠTT ≥ ΠNT and NT is never
the optimal policy.
For C¯T ≤ cT ≤ C¯T , the three feasible policies are TT , DD, and Nj ′(Θ1).
• The firm would adopt TT (otherwise DD) iff ΠTT ≥ ΠDD ⇐⇒
cT < C˜T ≡ cD + δp(θD − θT ) + ∆cθD2 .
• The firm would adopt TT (otherwise Nj ′(Θ1)) iff ΠTT ≥ ΠNj′ (Θ1) ⇐⇒
cT <≡ δp(θN−θT )+δpθN (1−θT )1+θN . We know that δp(θN − θT ) <
δp(θN−θT )+δpθN (1−θT )
(1+θN )
≡
δp(θN − θT ) + δpθN(θN − θT ) < δp(θN − θT ) + δpθN(1− θT ) ≡ δpθN(θN − θT ) <
δpθN(1− θT ) =⇒ C¯T = δp(θN − θT ) < δp(θN−θT )+δpθN (1−θT )1+θN . Since cT ≤ C¯T ,
ΠTT > ΠNj′ (Θ1).
For C¯T ≤ C¯T ≤ cT , the three feasible policies are TN , DD, and NN ′ .
• The firm would adopt TN (otherwise NN ′) iff ΠTN ≥ ΠNN ′ ⇐⇒
cT < CˆT ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + δpθN(1− θN).
• The firm would adopt TN (otherwise DD) iff ΠTN ≥ ΠDD ⇐⇒
cT ≤ 2cD + 2δpθD − δp(θT + θN) + ∆cθD ≡ C˜IIT .
• The firm would adopt DD (otherwise NN ′) iff ΠNN ′ ≥ ΠDD ⇐⇒
cD < Cˆ
I
D ≡ δpθN (3−θN )−θD(2δp+∆c)2 .
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Proof. Proof of Corollary 7 and Corollary 2
• We know that when cT < C˜IT ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + ∆cθN , the firm would adopt TN , else
NN . While at cT < C˜
II
T ≡ 2cD + 2δpθD − δp(θT + θN) + ∆cθD, the firm chooses TN
over DD. Hence, we define a condition in ∆c that would facilitate in ranking the
cutoffs C˜IT and C˜
II
T . Solving C˜
I
T − C˜IIT = 0, we define that when
∆c < ∆c
′
= 2δp(θN−θD)−2cD
(θD−θN ) , then C˜
I
T ≤ C˜IIT .
At this same condition, we also know ΠNN > ΠDD.
• Similarly, we also know that when cT < CˆT ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + δpθN(1− θN), the firm
would adopt TN , else NN
′
. While at cT < C˜
II
T , the firm chooses TN over DD.
Hence, we define a condition in ∆c that would facilitate in ranking the cutoffs CˆT
and C˜IIT . Solving CˆT − C˜IIT = 0, we define that when
∆c < ∆c
′′
=
3δpθN−δpθ2N−2cD−2δpθD
θD
, then C˜IIT ≤ CˆT .
At this same condition, we also know that ΠDD > ΠNN ′ .
Proof. Proof of Corollary 1 and Corollary 3
• We know that C˜IT ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + ∆cθN is decreasing in θT , since θN > θT . On the
other hand, it increases with δ as θN − θT > 0.
• We know that C˜IIT ≡ 2cD + 2δpθD − δp(θT + θN) + ∆cθD is decreasing in θT , since it
has a negative coefficient. On the other hand, by rearranging C˜IIT , we have
2cD + δp(θD − θT )− δp(θN − θD) + ∆cθD is decreasing with δ if
(θD − θT )− (θN − θD) < 0, else it increases with δ.
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• We know that cT ≤ C˜T ≡ cD + δp(θD − θT ) + ∆cθD2 is decreasing with θT . On the
other hand, it increases with δ if θD − θT > 0, else it decreases with δ.
• We know that CˆT ≡ δp(θN − θT ) + δpθN(1− θN) is decreasing with θT , since
θN − θT > 0. On the other hand, it increases with δ, since θN − θT > 0.
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